Niche products, generic products, and consumer search by Larson, Nathan
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Niche products, generic products, and
consumer search
Nathan Larson
University of Virginia
2008
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32161/
MPRA Paper No. 32161, posted 11 July 2011 19:58 UTC
Niche Products, Generic Products, and Consumer Search
Nathan Larson∗
Department of Economics
University of Virginia
P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
July 10, 2011
Abstract
We endogenize product design in a model of sequential search with random firm-consumer
match value à la Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999). We focus on a prod-
uct design choice by which a firm can control the dispersion of consumer valuations for its
product; we interpret low dispersion products as ‘generic’ and high dispersion products as
‘nichy.’ Equilibrium product design depends on a feedback loop: when reservation utility
is high (low), the marginal customer’s match improves (worsens) with more nichy prod-
ucts, encouraging high (low) diﬀerentiation by firms. In turn, when firms oﬀer more nichy
products, this induces more intense search; depending on search costs, this could raise or
lower consumers’ reservation utility. Remarkably, when the match distribution satisfies a
hazard rate condition, firm and consumer interests align: equilibrium product design always
adjusts to the level that maximizes utility. When this condition is not met, either multiple
equilibria (one nichy, the other generic) or one asymmetric equilibrium (generic and nichy
firms coexist) can arise; we argue that the former is more likely for common specifications
of consumer preferences.
Keywords: product diﬀerentiation; search; product design
JEL Codes D43 D83 L15
1 Introduction
Consider an entrepreneurial chemist choosing the scent profile for a new perfume. Understand-
ing that consumer tastes are idiosyncratic, he might emphasize safe smells — say, vanilla or
lavender — that most consumers would find pleasant and inoﬀensive. Alternatively, he could
emphasize bold, exotic scents that some consumers would love and others would hate. Further-
more, he knows that a consumer cannot be sure of exactly how much she will like his perfume
without at least making a trip to the store to sample it, and he faces competition from many
other chemists who face the same choices that he does. How unique or generic should he make
his product, how competitively should he price it, and how do consumer search costs factor into
these decisions?
∗I’d like to thank without implication Simon Anderson, Susan Athey, Abhijit Banerjee, Glenn Ellison, Bengt
Holmstrom, and participants at the MIT theory and Industrial Organization lunches.
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This paper addresses these questions by introducing endogenous product design into a
canonical model of sequential consumer search. Broadly, we find a negative relationship be-
tween search costs and what we will call the “nichiness” of products: firms choose polarizing
niche products when search costs are low and more generic products when search costs are
high. In the low search cost case, when consumers are relatively selective, firms can soften price
competition with an idiosyncratic product that provides very high value to a relatively small set
of consumers. Alternatively, when firms make their products as generic as possible, consumers
have little incentive to search for a better match; when search costs are high this turns out to
be a better way to soften price competition.
The search model that we use is based on Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault
(1999, henceforth AR) and features a continuum of firms and consumers. Each consumer’s
value for a particular firm’s product depends on a match-specific taste shock with mean zero
(plus a constant term that is common to all consumers). The firm’s product design choice
will involve choosing the variance of the taste shock for its product; in the perfume example,
this corresponds to the decision about how bland or provocative to make the scent. We will
refer to a product with a high taste shock variance as nichy, or idiosyncratic, or specialized; for
our purposes, these terms will all mean the same thing. In order to focus on the niche versus
generic aspect of product design, we treat the average quality of a product — that is, the mean
taste shock — as fixed.1 In the game, firms first (simultaneously) choose prices and product
nichiness. Consumers do not observe these choices, but they form expectations about their
aggregate distribution and believe that they will face a random draw from this distribution
at any given firm. Next consumers search. A consumer learns about her valuations for the
firms’ products, and the prices they are charging, by visiting them randomly and sequentially,
incurring a constant search cost with each visit. The optimal search strategy involves a cutoﬀ
rule: a consumer purchases from the first firm at which her surplus (valuation net of price)
exceeds a threshold. The focus is on pure strategy outcomes, and our equilibrium concept,
endogenous dispersion equilibrium (EDE), requires each firm to choose prices and nichiness
optimally given correct expectations about consumers’ cutoﬀ utilities, and each consumer to
choose a utility cutoﬀ rule optimally given correct expectations about the aggregate distribution
of prices and nichiness.2
The model is best suited to describing what could be called ‘sample goods’ for which con-
sumers have idiosyncratic tastes.3 These are similar to experience goods in the sense that a
consumer must spend some time, money, or eﬀort interacting with the good before she is able
to evaluate how much she likes it. However, they diﬀer from experience goods because the
consumer does not need to purchase the product outright before evaluating it — she can sample
it (at search cost c) instead. Goods that fit this profile include many consumer products for
which tastes are personal, such as books, music, cars, and clothing. For example, a consumer
can sample the work of an unfamiliar author for the time cost of a trip to the bookstore to
browse through its pages.4 This can quickly give her a sense of how well this particular author’s
style suits her own taste. In this case, product design is related to the author’s style and genre.
1However, it is not diﬃcult to incorporate a quality decision into the model of product design; we sketch an
extension along these lines in Section 4.
2Here, “endogenous dispersion” is intended to refer to the fact that a firm can control the dispersion of
consumer valuations for its product, not to price dispersion.
3 I thank one of the referees for pointing me toward this terminology.
4Or increasingly, for the time cost of browsing through free excerpts of the book online.
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An airport spy novel amounts to a generic product: it is no one’s ideal product, but it serves
most consumers relatively well in a pinch. On the other hand, other authors tend to provoke
stronger reactions: readers either love the work or hate it.5 Their books would be called nichy
products in our model. With a car, a consumer can research many details in advance, but it
is hard for her to be sure how much she will enjoy driving it without taking the time to do a
test drive. In this case, a nichy product could be one with particularly sporty handling: some
drivers will like the responsiveness, but others will wish the ride were less bumpy. Clothing
helps to illustrate how online markets relate to our model. Online markets would seem to oﬀer
less scope for sample goods, since one cannot handle the good before buying it. However, one
could argue that lenient return policies for online clothing purchases (sometimes including free
return shipping) have evolved to make online clothing more like a sample good: a consumer can
sample an item’s fit at a relatively low cost (time and shipping), and return it if she dislikes it.
Our first main finding is that a firm’s optimal product is always extreme (Lemma 2 and
Proposition 2). That is, a firm will create a product that disperses consumers’ valuations either
as much as possible (a nichy product) or as little as possible (a generic product), depending
on whether consumer utility is above or below a threshold level. In each case, the intuition
is roughly that a firm gains by improving the match with its marginal customer. When con-
sumers are relatively choosy, only customers with positive taste shocks will purchase, and these
customers are made happier by a more distinctive product. However, for low enough utility,
the marginal consumer is indiﬀerent between settling for a negative taste shock and contin-
ued search. In this case, making the product more generic makes this marginal consumer less
displeased with it, discouraging her from searching further.
Next we characterize the set of endogenous dispersion equilibrium at diﬀerent levels of the
search cost (Proposition 3). The progression is generally as follows. For low search costs, there
is one EDE with maximally nichy products. For intermediate search costs, there are either three
EDEs — one maximally nichy, one minimally nichy, and an asymmetric EDE with both nichy
and generic firms — or there is just one asymmetric EDE. For yet higher search costs, there is
one generic (minimally nichy) EDE. For higher search costs, consumers prefer not to search, and
there is no equilibrium. There are two caveats to this. First, for some parameters, equilibrium
may fail sooner, so that the intermediate or high cost cases above may not appear. Second,
it is possible for the intermediate case to vanish, so that the unique EDE shifts directly from
nichy to generic at a threshold search cost level. Thus, in a general sense, lower search costs
are associated with nichier products. Social surplus is maximized when products are maximally
idiosyncratic, regardless of search costs (Proposition 7), so product design represents a second
channel through which falling search costs improve welfare.
For search costs in the intermediate range, the type of equilibrium that arises depends subtly
on whether consumers or firms would capture more of the surplus gains associated with a shift
from a generic to a nichy market. If it is the consumers who capture more, then for the same
search cost there can be both a generic EDE with consumers who settle for low utility and
a nichy EDE with consumers who demand high utility, reinforced by firms’ incentive to oﬀer
nichier products to choosier consumers. Alternatively, the unique asymmetric equilibrium can
arise if firms are able to capture so much of the gains from a wholesale shift to nichy products
that consumers’ cutoﬀ utility falls as a result. In this case, neither a completely generic market
5Joyce and Faulkner come to mind, but every reader will have their own examples.
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nor a completely nichy market is stable; in the former, consumers are so choosy that firms
would rather oﬀer niche products, while in the latter consumers are suﬃciently accepting that
firms would like to switch back to generic products. In this case, generic and nichy firms must
coexist for intermediate search costs.
We show that when firm and consumer interests are aligned in a particular sense, neither
of these cases applies: the market has a unique equilibrium that shifts abruptly from generic
to nichy products as search costs fall below a threshold value (Proposition 4). This alignment
occurs for a large family of consumer taste distributions (including the uniform and exponential)
that satisfy a hazard rate condition. For these distributions, diﬀerentiation always adjusts
endogenously to the level that maximizes consumers’ equilibrium utility (Proposition 6).
The hazard rate condition roughly relates to whether a firm can extract a constant fraction
of the total surplus from a match as consumers become choosier. We argue that if this frac-
tion declines (rises) with choosier consumers, multiple symmetric equilibria (one asymmetric
equilibrium) are more likely to arise. For taste distributions that are commonly used (such as
the normal, logistic, extreme value, and generalized Pareto), this fraction is either constant or
declining — as consumers are pushed further into the right tail of their tastes, their surplus rises
faster than the equilibrium price. In contrast, the examples of asymmetric equilibria that we
have found involve taste distributions with abruptly truncated right tails. Absent any com-
pelling reason to expect this type of truncation in tastes, we regard the coexistence of “generic”
and “specialized” firms as an interesting but probably uncommon outcome in our model.
The paper leads oﬀ with a connection to product diﬀerentiation. In the model, taste shocks
are drawn independently across consumer-firm pairs. This will imply (Proposition 1) that a
higher level of nichiness among products — that is, greater dispersion in consumer valuations
for each product — can also be interpreted as a greater degree of diﬀerentiation between every
pair of products. In this sense, our paper connects to prior work on the role of both search
frictions and product diﬀerentiation in softening price competition. These topics have been
studied extensively but usually separately, with seminal contributions by Diamond (1971) on
the former and Perloﬀ and Salop (1985) on the latter. The interaction between the two was
studied in a unified model first by Wolinsky (1986) and later Anderson and Renault (1999).
AR use this model to study entry and to derive reasonable comparative statics predictions
about the response of prices to search costs, the heterogeneity of consumer tastes, and the
level of product diﬀerentiation, which is taken to be exogenous. We build on AR in several
ways. First, we introduce an endogenous product design choice for firms and demonstrate a
formal sense in which it can “diﬀerentiate” consumers’ values for diﬀerent products. Then, by
characterizing equilibria with endogenously nichy or generic products, we are able to study how
product design responds to search costs. Particularly for intermediate search costs, the subtle
relationship between the distribution of consumer tastes and the response of product design
would not have been obvious in a model without endogenous diﬀerentiation.
A recent spate of papers extends the AR model in a diﬀerent direction by studying what
happens if search is directed rather than random. In Arbatskaya (2007), Haan and Moraga
González (2007), and Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2008) consumers search in an order re-
lated to how prominent firms are or how much they advertise. The latter also study an extension
with quality diﬀerentiation, finding that a higher quality firm has a greater incentive to make
itself more prominent to consumers. Another strand of the literature builds on Butters’ (1977)
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monopoly model of consumers who learn about products from advertising. Christou and Vettas
(2008) extend this model to diﬀerentiated product competition. They find that the manner in
which consumers are informed can tend to generate firm profit functions that are not quasicon-
cave, so a firm’s optimal strategy can jump between high sales at a low price and low sales at
a high price. While the causes are diﬀerent, this is reminiscent of our finding that when firms
optimize over both product design and price, their profits are not quasiconcave with respect
to the product design choice. Finally, Anderson and Renault (2006) allow a firm to advertise
information either about its price or about its product. This literature on directed search and
advertising is complementary to our paper’s focus on endogenous product diﬀerentiation. Com-
bining the two, in particular, studying product design when firms can advertise both price and
product features, would be a natural subject for further study.
In contrast with the non-spatial approach to product diﬀerentiation in Wolinsky and AR,
another branch of the literature studies diﬀerentiation that arises from a firm’s location, where
this location might be in physical or product space. Here, endogenous location choice by firms
is often the first stage in multi-stage competition that ends with the firms competing in prices.
While we will not try to survey this literature here, two of the most celebrated results predict
extreme levels of diﬀerentiation. Hotelling (1929) famously showed (among other results) that
two firms with fixed and equal prices will choose to diﬀerentiate their products minimally
in equilibrium (by choosing the same location). In contrast, d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and
Thisse (1979) show that when the firms do choose prices, this result reverses — pure strategy
equilibrium outcomes involve maximal diﬀerentiation. The intuition for the latter result is
loosely that diﬀerentiating more is in each firm’s individual interest because the gains from
softened price competition outweigh the losses from moving further away from the tastes of the
median consumer. While this intuition is appealing, testing it in settings with many firms and
alternative product spaces has been diﬃcult because spatial models of product diﬀerentiation
rarely “scale up” gracefully. By returning to a non-spatial model of diﬀerentiation à la Wolinsky
and AR, we will be able to show that these examples illustrate a general principle of extreme
diﬀerentiation and that an outcome of maximal or minimal diﬀerentiation in any particular
case can be explained in a sensible way by consumer search costs.
Two recent papers in the marketing literature also touch on the interaction of endogenous
product design and search costs. Kuksov’s (2004) setting is quite diﬀerent from ours: he looks
at spatial product diﬀerentiation between duopolists when consumers search for prices but know
their product preferences in advance. He finds the same general pattern that we do — product
diﬀerentiation rises as search costs fall — but otherwise the models are not easily compared.
More closely related are Cachon, Terwiesch, and Xu (2008) who study both sequential and
non-sequential search in a random utility framework similar to AR. Their firms choose how
many products to oﬀer, and a visiting consumer can purchase whichever of these products gives
her the best (i.i.d.) match. Thus, in both models a firm chooses a parameter that aﬀects the
distribution of taste shocks realized by consumers who visit. Because every consumer’s best
match at a firm improves (in expectation) as the firm adds more products, their model cannot
disentangle the eﬀect of this overall quality improvement from any eﬀect related to horizontal
diﬀerentiation, so in this respect, the two models address diﬀerent questions. Furthermore,
their model specializes to extreme value-distributed taste shocks, and some of their results
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appear to depend delicately on this assumption.6 In contrast, we show that the shape of the
taste distribution has a major influence on equilibrium outcomes for intermediate search costs.
Finally, in recent work, Johnson and Myatt (2006) develop a model of product design, involving
rotations of a firm’s demand curve, that has a similar flavor to our distinction between generic
and niche products. As in our paper, they also find that a firm’s optimal design tends toward
one of these two extremes. However, their focus is on advertising by firms, and they do not
consider search.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and develops
useful partial equilibrium results. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium and contains the main
results of the paper. Section 4 considers extending the options available to a firm in two
important ways: by allowing investments in higher product quality, and by allowing a firm to
oﬀer a product line with more than one product. Section 5.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumer preferences and diﬀerentiation
The model is one of symmetric, non-spatial competition in horizontally diﬀerentiated products
with sequential, random search by consumers. Much of the basic structure is shared with
Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999). There is a continuum of firms, indexed
by m ∈ [0, 1], each selling a single diﬀerentiated good. A consumer i has willingness to pay for
good m given by
Aim = Aμ + σmzim
In this expression, Aμ should be interpreted as a consumer’s average valuation for the good,
across all firms. (This is the same for all consumers.) The second term, σmzim, reflects how
much more or less than average consumer i likes the particular version of the good oﬀered by
firm m. In particular, firm m’s good embodies an amount σm of a polarizing feature (also
labeled m). A firm’s product design choice will be to choose the level of σm. The possible
levels of that polarizing feature are represented by a positive interval: σm ∈ [σL,σH ], where
0 < σL < σH . Consumer i’s marginal utility for firm m’s feature is given by zim. Some
consumers will be pleased and others displeased to have more of feature m; specifically, these
marginal utilities are distributed randomly with density f(zim), independently across i and
m. This incorporates two assumptions: consumer valuations are distributed symmetrically
across all goods, and valuations are independent across goods — a consumer’s preference for
one attribute (and its corresponding good) provides no information about his preference for
other goods. Also define the corresponding cumulative distribution function F (z). Both the
distribution and density functions are assumed to be are continuously diﬀerentiable, and the
following condition is also imposed.
Condition 1 The density function f(z) is symmetric, logconcave, and has mean 0 and support
(−∞,∞).
The zero mean assumption is used to isolate the choice of σm, which aﬀects the dispersion
of consumer valuations for a product, from product design choices (quality improvements) that
6For example, they find that when firms behave symmetrically, the intensity of consumer search does not
change with the number of products per firm.
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improve the average valuation Aμ. We focus on the choice of σm in this paper, but it is not
diﬃcult to extend the model to consider quality improvements as well — we sketch such an
extension in Section 4. The assumption of an unbounded support is technically convenient
but not essential. Symmetry is only necessary for the strong version of product diﬀerentiation
introduced in Definition 1, while logconcavity helps both in defining product diﬀerentiation and
later in guaranteeing an interior solution to a firm’s optimal pricing problem. Many commonly
used distributions are logconcave, including the normal and uniform distributions (see Bagnoli
and Bergstrom (2005) for examples). Logconcavity of the density implies logconcavity of the
distribution function, and logconcave distributions have increasing hazard rates, facts that will
be useful in the sequel.
Since this formulation of product diﬀerentiation can seem a bit abstract, a few concrete
examples may help to fix ideas. One could think, for example, of a restaurant choosing its
format. Holding the quality level fixed, a neutral format like modern American cuisine might
generate relatively small taste diﬀerences among consumers, while a more polarizing format
like a less familiar ethnic cuisine or a theme (rock and roll, medieval, etc.) might substantially
enhance the experience for some diners and detract from it for others. We would interpret
the modern American restaurant as a low σ choice and the other options as high σ choices.
Similarly, an apparel firm choosing slogans for a tee shirt might opt either for something bland
and inoﬀensive, or for something with niche appeal (bawdy humor, political slogans, etc) that
will substantially enhance its value to some consumers but make it unwearable for others —
again, these would be low σ or high σ choices, respectively. The practical implication of the
independence of the match-specific shock across firms and consumers is that there is no shortage
of directions along which firms might diﬀerentiate. In the restaurant example, there is eﬀectively
a limitless number of idiosyncratic restaurant formats (Mexican, Thai, Ethiopian, Indian, ...),
each of which can come in a lower σ versions that tone the food down for average tastes and
higher σ versions that cater to enthusiasts.7
There is another possible interpretation of the firm’s product diﬀerentiation choice which
does not require assuming that some consumers dislike more of some features. In this inter-
pretation, a product consists of a bundle of features. While consumers have positive marginal
utility for all features, technological constraints require a firm that employs more of one feature
to trade it oﬀ against less of some other feature. For example, one could think of cell phones.
At a given cost point, current levels of miniaturization might allow a producer to incorporate
a superb camera and a terrible music player, a very good music player and an adequate web
browser, or decent, but not great, functionality for all three features. While all of these combi-
nations might generate the same average consumer valuation, the more lopsided combinations
(e.g. an excellent camera, with lip service paid to other features) may generate more of a split
between consumers who really love the emphasized feature and consumers who care more about
other things — this would be a high σ product. On the other hand, more balanced products
that oﬀer something to appeal to everyone will tend to generate consumer valuations with a
7This is, of course, a stylization. Furthermore, independence implies that there is no correlation or crowding
out of tastes — my tastes for Indian and Ethiopian foods are unrelated to each other and are not statistically
closer to each other than either is to my taste for Italian food. In this respect as well, the model (and non-spatial
models generally) is an imperfect fit to reality. While this stylization is standard, and enormously useful in
keeping the model tractable, exploring models with a more nuanced structure of match-specific taste shocks
would certainly be of interest.
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lower variance — these would be low σ products.8
To be mathematically precise about the sense in which higher σ corresponds to greater
diﬀerentiation, we introduce the following definition. According to this definition, two goods
become more or less diﬀerentiated as a typical consumer’s valuations for them grow further
apart or closer together:
Definition 1 Let Dmn(k) be the probability that the diﬀerence in a consumer’s values for goods
m and n is less than k: Dmn(k) = Pr(|Aim − Ain| ≤ k). We will say that goods m0 and n0
are weakly more (less) diﬀerentiated than goods m and n if Dm0n0(k) ≤ Dmn(k) for all k ≥ 0
(Dm0n0(k) ≥ Dmn(k)) for all k ≥ 0), with the inequality strict for some k. If the inequality is
strict for all k > 0, we will say that m0 and n0 are strictly more (less) diﬀerentiated.
Under this definition, goods do in fact become more diﬀerentiated as more of either polar-
izing feature is added:
Proposition 1 Fix any three goods m, m0, and n, and assume Condition 1 holds. Then m0
and n are strictly more diﬀerentiated than m and n if and only if σm0 > σm.
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice again that diﬀerentiation is non-spatial: by further customizing its product, a firm
distances itself from all other firms, and by making its product more generic, it crowds all other
firms. Furthermore, diﬀerentiation operates symmetrically among all of the goods: no two
goods are intrinsically “closer” to each other than any other two. Loosely, Proposition 1 tells
us that the fraction of consumers that could be induced to switch between products m and n
by a price diﬀerence of k declines as σm or σn rises, for any price diﬀerence k.
While logconcavity and symmetry cover many important taste distributions, they exclude
some interesting cases. To cover these cases, we introduce a second, weaker definition of hori-
zontal diﬀerentiation. Suppose only that f has a zero mean and finite variance s2.
Definition 2 The mean square taste diﬀerence between goodsm and n is Smn ≡ E
³
(Aim −Ain)2
´
It is trivial to show that the mean square taste diﬀerence between goodsm and n is increasing
in both σm and σn :
Smn = E
³
(σmzim − σnzin)2
´
=
¡σ2m + σ2n¢ s2
An increase in Smn indicates that consumer valuations form and n are further apart on average,
but they need not be further apart in the stricter pointwise sense of Definition 1. As a simple
example of how these two definitions can diverge, consider the degenerate taste distribution F
that places equal weight on z = 1 and z = −1. Suppose firm m chooses σm = 1 and firm n
chooses σn = 0, so Smn = 1. If firm n0 chooses σn0 = 1, then Smn0 = 2, so mean square taste
diﬀerences between m and n0 are greater than between m and n. However, for m and n, the
realized diﬀerence |σmzm − σnzn| always equals 1. For m and n0, this diﬀerence is sometimes
2 and sometimes 0, so some consumers will find m and n0 less similar than m and n, while
others will find them more similar. For this reason, we should not expect the implications for
price competition to be quite as clear and unambiguous when only Definition 2 applies, but not
Definition 1.
8 Interested readers can consult the working version of this paper for a formal model along these lines.
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2.2 Timing and Equilibrium
The game has two stages. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its strategy, once
and for all. In general, a strategy for firm m will be a pair (σm, pm) ∈ [σL,σH ]× [0,∞), where
σm is the nichiness of the firm’s product (chosen from a compact interval [σL,σH ]) and pm is its
price. Both components of the strategy are chosen simultaneously. We focus on pure strategies
for a single firm, but as is usual with a continuum of firms, asymmetric strategy profiles can
be given a mixed strategy interpretation. Let us summarize the distribution of (σ, p) pairs in
the firms’ strategy profile with a function P : [σL,σH ] × [0,∞) → [0, 1], where P (σ, p) is the
measure of firms m with strategies satisfying σm ≤ σ and pm ≤ p. Note that P is analogous to
a cumulative distribution function.
In the second stage of the game, consumers search for products. Each consumer i has unit
inelastic demand and realizes a net utility equal to uim = Aim−pm if he purchases from firm m.
Consumer i knows the taste shock distribution F (z), but he does not know his realized taste
shock zim at any firm that he has not visited. He does not observe the firms’ first stage actions,
but he forms beliefs about those actions. To reflect the idea that a consumer has no basis for
distinguishing between firms, we restrict these beliefs to treat firms anonymously. Formally
anonymity will mean the following.9
Anonymous Consumer Beliefs
1. Consumer i forms a belief function Bi : [σL,σH ]× [0,∞)→ [0, 1], interpreted as his belief
about the distribution of (σ, p) pairs among firms.
2. At any firm m that he has not previously visited, consumer i believes (σm, pm) to be an
independent random draw from distribution Bi, and he believes his taste shock zim to be
an independent random draw from F .
Our equilibrium concept will require consumers to hold consistent beliefs about the aggre-
gate distribution of firms’ actions; thus, later we will impose Bi = P . Firms’ choices and the
taste shocks only matter to a consumer to the extent that they aﬀect his utility uim from a
purchase, so we can summarize a consumer’s beliefs by a probability distribution
Gi(u) = Pr(uim ≤ u |Bi(σ, p), F (z))
over the net utility available to him at a randomly chosen firm.
A consumer has the following options. He can quit the market immediately, walking away
with utility 0, or at cost c > 0, he can visit a randomly selected firm m where he learns
(σm, pm, zim). Thus he learns his valuation for the firm’s product Aim = Aμ+σmzim, its price,
and therefore, his net utility draw uim. He then has four options: he can purchase the product
from m and leave the market, he can leave the market without purchasing, he can purchase
(at no additional cost) from any previously visited firm, or he can continue to search. If he
continues to search, he incurs cost c > 0 and visits a new firm randomly chosen from those he
has not previously visited. This process continues until the consumer has left the market.
Notice that our notion of anonymous beliefs precludes a consumer from revising his expec-
tations about the strategies of unvisited firms on the basis the information that he observed
9 I am grateful to an editor for suggesting this terminology.
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by visiting firm m. This is restrictive, but in the context of our model it is reasonable, given
that firms act independently, and there is no common factor in firms’ decisions, like a common
cost shock, for consumers to learn about. The assumption also serves to pin down a consumer’s
subsequent beliefs if she ever were to observe a price outside of the support of Bi.
Since there is a continuum of firms, consumer i’s decision problem amounts to an optimal
stopping problem with a stationary distribution. He can observe a sequence of utility draws
from Gi (u), at cost c for each draw, and must decide when to quit and take one of the utilities
(that is, buy one of the products) that he has seen so far. It is a standard result that in this
setting an optimal search strategy for consumer i can be expressed in terms of some stationary
cutoﬀ u¯i. That is, as soon as consumer i visits a firm that gives him utility greater than or equal
to u¯i, he purchases and leaves the game; otherwise he continues to search. This encompasses
the option to quit the game immediately: if u¯i < 0, the consumer ‘buys’ his outside option
utility of 0 and exits. With this justification in mind, there is no loss of generality in restricting
our analysis of consumer strategies to the set of stationary cutoﬀ rules.
While diﬀerent consumers have diﬀerent taste shocks ex post, ex ante they are identical. In
the model, a firm cannot control how many consumers show up at its front door, and the number
of consumers who do happen to show up has no bearing on the strategy that maximizes its profit
per consumer arrival. Furthermore, consumers actions do not directly aﬀect other consumers’
payoﬀs. For these reasons, we will remain vague about the total number of consumers. One
can think of a single representative consumer or a continuum of ex ante identical consumers;
this makes no diﬀerence to the results. Furthermore, Lemma 1 will show that for any given
belief about firms, a consumer’s best response threshold is unique. Thus, any sensible notion
of equilibrium with consistent consumer beliefs must have all consumers choosing the same
(pure strategy) threshold u¯. To avoid the surplus notation of defining distributions over u¯i, we
will simply restrict attention to equilibria in which consumers have symmetric cutoﬀ rules and
beliefs.
Finally, note that in a standard oligopoly model without search, the strategies of competing
firms enter firm m’s payoﬀ function directly. Here, because of the sequential search structure,
they do not — the expected profit that firm m receives from a consumer visit depends only
on the consumer’s choosiness u¯i and on its own strategy. (Of course, u¯i will depend on the
consumer’s beliefs about the strategies of other firms. Similarly, the number of consumers who
arrive at firm m’s front door will depend on both u¯i and on other firms’ strategies, but this has
no bearing on firm m’s own strategy choice.)
Now we are prepared to define our equilibrium concept, which we call an endogenous dis-
persion equilibrium (EDE) to emphasize the fact that the dispersion of consumers’ taste shocks
is a choice variable for firms. An assessment for the game is a collection {σ,p, u¯, B}, where
σ : [0, 1] → [σL,σH ], with σ (m) = σm, specifies firms’ nichiness choices, p : [0, 1] → [0,∞),
with p (m) = pm, specifies firms’ prices, u¯ is a threshold utility for consumers, and B is an
anonymous belief function for consumers.
An endogenous dispersion equilibrium is an assessment satisfying the following conditions:
1. (Firms optimize) For allm ∈ [0, 1], (σ (m) ,p (m))maximizes firmm’s profit per consumer
visit, given consumer cutoﬀ rule u¯.
2. (Consumers optimize) The cutoﬀ utility u¯ maximizes a consumer’s utility from search
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(net of search costs), given anonymous belief function B.
3. (Aggregate consistency of beliefs) Let P be the the distribution of firms generated by
(σ,p). Then B = P .
Below we discuss the firm and consumer decision problems in more detail. One notable
result (Lemma 2) is that a firm will always prefer its product to disperse consumer valuations
either as much as possible, or as little as possible. Then we combine the two decision problems
and characterize equilibria of the model.
2.3 Consumer’s problem
A consumer with beliefs B (σ, p) who anticipates that the utility he would receive (net of price)
from a purchase made at the next firm he visits is distributed according to
G(u) = Pr(Aμ + σmzim − pm ≤ u |B(σ, p), F (z)) .
Consider a consumer whose current best oﬀer in hand, including the option to quit without
purchasing and accept 0, is u˜. (So we will have u˜ = 0 for consumers who have not yet searched
and consumers who have received only negative utility draws at the firms visited so far.) Suppose
this consumer decides to search at one additional firm and then take the best available oﬀer
and leave the market. Relative to leaving the market now, this additional search benefits the
consumer only if utility at the new firm is strictly greater than u˜, and costs c regardless. The
expected net gain to conducting the additional search isZ
u≥u˜
(u− u˜) dG(u)− c
Let the utility threshold u¯ be defined byZ
u≥u¯
(u− u¯) dG(u) = c (1)
Lemma 1 For any consumer beliefs B (σ, p), there is a unique utility threshold u¯ satisfying
(1).
Proof. Appendix.
For a consumer whose best current utility oﬀer is strictly less than u¯, the expected net gain
from an additional search is positive, while a consumer holding an oﬀer better than u¯ should
take it and leave the market. Notice that this incorporates the participation constraint on
search: if the u¯ that solves (1) is negative, then taking the best oﬀer in hand, which might be
to quit the market without purchasing and earn 0, always dominates continued search. Since
the search environment is stationary, this means that if u¯ is negative, consumers will not be
willing to search at all. (Put slightly diﬀerently, if u¯ < 0 satisfies (1), then Ru≥0 u dG(u) < c, so
the net benefit of a single search is negative.) Alternatively, if u¯ > 0, then the optimal search
strategy is to start searching, and accept the first utility oﬀer that is weakly greater than u¯.10
10 In our model, the assumption that a consumer can costlessly purchase any product visited in the past is
inessential — the results would not change if recalling old products were costly. This is true for two reasons.
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We can write the expected gross gain from an additional search more explicitly in terms of
beliefs B and the distribution of taste shocks F . Note that at a firm with strategy (σ, p), the
condition u ≥ u˜ is equivalent to z ≥ u˜+p−Aμσ . Using this, define
L (u˜) ≡
Z
u≥u˜
(u− u˜) dG(u) (2)
=
Z
(σ,p)∈SB
Z ∞
u˜+p−Aμ
σ
((Aμ + σz − p)− u˜) dF (z) dB (σ, p)
Integrating the interior integral by parts gives us the convenient representation
L (u˜) =
Z
(σ,p)∈SB
σI
µ
u˜+ p−Aμ
σ
¶
dB (σ, p) , where (3)
I (z˜) ≡
Z ∞
z˜
1− F (z) dz
where SB denotes the support of the consumer’s beliefs about (σ, p). Thus, an alternative
characterization of the unique optimal search cutoﬀ (given beliefs B) isZ
(σ,p)∈SB
σI
µ
u¯+ p−Aμ
σ
¶
dB (σ, p) = c (4)
The integrand is the utility improvement expected by a consumer (with current best oﬀer
u¯) from one additional search, conditional on visiting a type (σ, p) firm. The lefthand side takes
a weighted average of these expected improvements over the distribution of firm strategies.
From (4), one can see a straightforward partial equilibrium eﬀect of search costs on consumer
behavior. Holding beliefs about firms constant, a fall in c requires an equilibrating decline in
the lefthand side of (4), so the threshold utility u¯ at which consumers quit searching rises.
Remember that 1−F
³
u¯+p−Aμ
σ
´
is the probability of a purchase when a consumer visits a type
(σ, p) firm; so as search costs fall and u¯ rises, these purchase probabilities decline across the
board, indicating choosier behavior by consumers. The eﬀect of a change in beliefs B (σ, p) on
the best response cutoﬀ u¯ is more subtle; we defer an analysis of this until Section 3.
2.4 Firm’s problem
Each firm simultaneously chooses a level of dispersion and a price (σ, p) ∈ S = [σL,σH ]×[0,∞)
so as to maximize its profit per consumer visit, given the belief that all consumers search
according to some common threshold rule u¯.11 The choice of σ can be thought of as one facet
of a broader product design process in which the firm decides on a set of features to include
First, because the optimal cutoﬀ strategy is stationary, if a product was not chosen when it was first visited, a
consumer will never want to return to it later on. Second (and this is related), because there is a continuum of
firms, a consumer is never forced to revisit old products because she has run out of new products to visit. Of
course, the distinction between free and costly recall would become more important if the number of products
were finite.
11 In principle, it would be more general to formulate firm beliefs about consumers as a probability distribution
over utility thresholds, rather than assuming that beliefs are concentrated. However, since Lemma 1 establishes
that consumers will concentrate on a single u¯, there is no risk of overlooking equilibria by formulating firm beliefs
as we do.
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in its product.12 We treat this product design process in reduced form by assuming that the
firm controls parameters that aﬀect consumers’ willingness to pay for its product. Furthermore,
we assume that the firm’s product design decisions can be decomposed in terms of ‘vertical’
features, which aﬀect consumers’ mean valuation for the product, and ‘horizontal’ features that
aﬀect how dispersed valuations are around that mean. One could study the vertical component
of product design by giving firms an additional choice to increase Aμ (at some cost). Our model
shuts down this component of product design in order to focus on the horizontal dimension,
but Section 4 sketches an extension that includes both.
By stipulating that σL > 0, we intend to capture the idea that (with the exception of pure
commodities) most products have idiosyncrasies that appeal more to some consumers than to
others. While a firm can choose to emphasize those idiosyncrasies (higher σ) or to downplay
them (lower σ), it cannot eliminate them entirely. There is no cost associated with choosing
σ, but of course the limits at σL and σH can be interpreted as the points at which reducing or
increasing idiosyncrasy further becomes prohibitively costly.
After choosing σ and p, the firm can produce its product on demand at zero marginal cost.
Firm m’s expected profit per consumer visit if it chooses (σm, pm) is
πm = pmPr (uim ≥ u¯ |σm, pm)
where Pr (uim ≥ u¯ |σm, pm) is the probability that a consumer who arrives at firm m makes a
purchase. Given the firm’s strategy and its belief about consumers’ cutoﬀ rule, this probability
is
Pr (uim ≥ u¯ |σm, pm) = 1− F ( u¯−Aμ + pmσm )
Thus, the firm solves
max
(σm,pm)∈S
πm (σm, pm ; u¯) where (5)
πm (σm, pm ; u¯) = pm(1− F ( u¯−Aμ + pmσm ))
For firms, the choice of σ and p is simultaneous. However, it is analytically convenient to
study the optimization in two steps. First, fix an arbitrary dispersion level σm and solve the
price-setting problem:
π∗m (σm ; u¯) ≡ max
pm∈[0,∞)
pm(1− F ( u¯−Aμ + pmσm )) (6)
The function π∗m (σm ; u¯) identifies the greatest profit that can be achieved at each possible
choice of σm. Then solve
maxσm∈[σL,σH ]
π∗m (σm ; u¯) (7)
12 In an earlier version of this paper, we show that our reduced form model of product design can be generated
by explicitly modeling a product as a bundle of features. Consumer valuations are hedonic over these features,
and a consumer’s taste for diﬀerent features is random. A firm can create a product that blends a little bit of
a lot of diﬀerent features. This corresponds to a low σ product — most consumers will have valuations near the
mean, as their enthusiasm about some features will be balanced by lukewarm feelings about others. Alternatively
(the high σ case), a firm can focus on providing high intensity for one or two features and ignoring others — this
will lead to consumer valuations that are more dispersed.
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to identify the optimal choice of σm.
To guarantee a unique interior solution to the price-setting component of the optimization,
we impose the following:
Condition 2 (QC) The firm profit function (5) is strictly quasiconcave in pm (for any values
of σm and u¯).
Following Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991), one can show that logconcavity of f(z) is suﬃcient
(but not necessary) to ensure quasiconcavity of (5) in pm, so Condition 1 implies (QC). Be-
cause we will spend some time later studying taste distributions that satisfy (QC) but are not
logconcave, we mention the condition separately now.
Under condition (QC), (6) has a unique maximizing price (for each σm and belief u¯) identified
by the first order condition:13
∂πm (σm, pm ; u¯)
∂pm =
µ
1− F ( u¯−Aμ + pmσm )
¶
− pmσm f(
u¯−Aμ + pm
σm ) = 0 (8)
or pm = p (σm; u¯), with
p (σ; u¯) ≡ σm1− F ((u¯−Aμ + p (σ; u¯))/σm)
f((u¯−Aμ + p (σ; u¯))/σm) (9)
Next, turn to the choice of σm. We present the following result as a lemma.14
Lemma 2 For any belief u¯ about consumer behavior, the maximizers of (7) form a subset of
{σL,σH}. That is, the optimal level of dispersion is always extreme — either σL is optimal or
σH is optimal (or possibly both).
Proof. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that an interior choice σˆ ∈ (σL,σH) were op-
timal. The maximized profit (over both σ and price) would be pm (σˆ ; u¯) (1 − F (zˆ)), where
zˆ =
u¯−Aμ+pm(σˆ ; u¯)
σˆ is the taste shock of the firm’s marginal consumer. This marginal taste
shock must be either positive, negative, or zero. If zˆ > 0, then suppose the firm deviates to
σH , leaving its price pm (σˆ ; u¯) unchanged. This reduces the marginal taste shock from zˆ to
z0 = u¯−Aμ+pm(σˆ ; u¯)σH , strictly improving both the chance of a purchase, and expected profit. Al-
ternatively, suppose that zˆ < 0. In this case the firm could deviate to σL, again leaving its price
at pm (σˆ ; u¯). Since σL < σˆ and the numerator of zˆ must be negative, this would also reduce
the marginal taste shock, so the firm could strictly improve its chance of a purchase and its
profit in this case as well. Finally, suppose that zˆ = 0. Consider a sequence of deviations: first
switch the dispersion level to σH , leaving the price unchanged. This switch leaves the marginal
taste shock at zero, and does not change the firm’s expected profit. But note that in this
strategy, (σH , pm (σˆ ; u¯)), the price is not set optimally. Next adjust the price from pm (σˆ ; u¯)
13 If f is logconcave, existence and uniqueness of a solution to (??) is guaranteed by the fact that 1−F (z)
f(z)
is a
decreasing function. If (QC) holds but f is not logconcave, use the fact that pm(1 − F ( u¯−Aμ+pmσm )) must tend
to zero as pm → ∞. (The right tail 1 − F (z) must tend to zero faster than 1z since, by assumption, F (z)
has a well-defined mean.) Then quasiconcavity implies a unique interior maximum, identified by the first order
condition.
14This result is similar to a result of Johnson and Myatt (2006) in a context without search.
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to pm (σH ; u¯); by the strict quasiconcavity of the price-setting problem, this strictly improves
expected profit.
In summary, regardless of zˆ, the firm can always earn strictly higher profits by using either
σL or σH rather than σˆ, contradicting the assertion that σˆ is optimal.
Define pH (u¯) and pL (u¯) to be the optimal price (determined by (9)) for a firm with a
product of type σH or σL that anticipates a consumer cutoﬀ strategy u¯. Let πH (u¯) and
πL (u¯) be the profit earned by a firm with product σH and price pH (u¯) (or σL and pL (u¯)
respectively). By Lemma 2 and (QC) each firm’s optimal strategy is simply to set either
(σL, pL (u¯)) or (σH , pH (u¯)), depending on whether πL (u¯) or πH (u¯) is larger. We summarize
this point formally.
Remark 1 Suppose that consumer threshold u¯ is part of an EDE assessment. Condition (QC)
and Proposition 2 imply that firms’ strategies in this assessment must satisfy (σm, pm) ∈
{(σL, pL (u¯)) , (σH , pH (u¯))} for all m ∈ [0, 1].
The fact that firm profits are quasiconvex in σm has a fairly straightforward economic
intuition. Because of search costs, a firm has temporary monopoly power over a visiting con-
sumer. If we use terminology loosely by referring to ‘quantity’ when we really mean ‘probability
of sale,’ then the firm essentially acts like a monopolist facing the demand curve [quantity]
= 1−F ( u¯−Aμ+pmσm ). Note that the consumer’s outside option u¯ acts like a demand shifter here.
The firm’s product design choice σm pivots this demand curve around the quantity 1− F (0).
A higher choice of σm makes this demand curve more vertical — it tilts out at (high price, low
quantity) pairs, and tilts in at (low price, high quantity) pairs. A lower choice of σm has the
opposite eﬀect. Now suppose the firm has chosen an interior level of σm and priced optimally
on its demand curve. Then consider shifting this choice of σm up or down. One of these two
changes must tilt the firm’s demand at its current price outward (and the other one shifts de-
mand inward).15 Thus a firm can always improve its profit by shifting away from its interior
level of σm, in whichever direction tilts its demand outward.
3 Equilibrium
A convenient implication of Lemma 2, and a corollary to Remark 2.4, is the following.
Remark 2 Suppose that consumer threshold u¯ is part of an EDE assessment. Then the con-
sumer beliefsB in this assessment must be concentrated on the two point set {(σL, pL (u¯)) , (σH , pH (u¯))}.
This follows directly from the consistency of beliefs. In other words there cannot be an
EDE in which firms choose (and consumers expect to face) more than two distinct (σ, p) pairs
— namely, the ones listed in Remark 3. Therefore, from this point forward, without loss of
generality, we restrict attention to assessments of the form {(λ,p) , u¯, (λe,pe)}. In this ex-
pression, λ = (λL,λH) denotes the fraction of firms choosing σL and σH respectively (with
λL + λH = 1), and p = (pL, pH) denotes the price set by a type σL or σH firm. The consumer
threshold u¯ is unchanged. Consumer beliefs are now summarized more concisely by (λe,pe),
15Unless the firm has chosen the pivot quantity 1− F (0).
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where λ = (λeL,λeH) denotes consumer beliefs about the fraction of each type of firm, and
pe = (peL, p
e
H) denotes consumer expectations about the price charged by each type of firm.
Such a profile satisfies the definition of an EDE if the following hold.
Firm optimization:
λH
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
= 0 if πL (u¯) > πH (u¯)
= 1 if πL (u¯) < πH (u¯)
∈ [0, 1] if πL (u¯) = πH (u¯)
, and
A type σL or σH firm sets the price pL (u¯) or pH (u¯) that solves (9)
Consumer optimization:
λeLσLI
µ
u¯+ peL −Aμ
σL
¶
+ λeHσHI
µ
u¯+ peH −Aμ
σH
¶
= c (10)
Consistent beliefs:
λe = λ and pe = p = (pL (u¯) , pH (u¯))
All equilibria are either symmetric — all firms choose the same σ and set the same price —
or asymmetric, with a mixture of generic and nichy firms. For the latter case, we can write the
consumer optimization condition as the pair of conditions:
λeLσLI (z¯L) + λeHσHI (z¯H) = c
Aμ + σLz¯L − peL = u¯ = Aμ + σLz¯H − peH
Written this way, z¯L and z¯H identify the minimum acceptable taste shock for a consumer when
visiting a generic or a nichy firm. The second line ensures that the consumer is holding out for
equal utility levels at each type of firm, after adjusting for prices.
The type of equilibrium — generic, nichy, or mixed — will depend on how firms’ expectations
about consumer choosiness aﬀect product choice, and conversely, on how consumers’ expecta-
tions about the product mix, as well as the search cost c, aﬀect their willingness to search. We
examine these in turn.
How does a firm’s optimal level of σ depend on its expectation of u¯ ?
Proposition 2 answers this question unambiguously: the more selective consumers are ex-
pected to be, the stronger the incentives for a firm to switch from a generic to a nichy product.
First, we introduce the following condition.
Condition 3 (H) The taste distribution satisfies h (z) ≡ z − 1−F (z)f(z) strictly increasing, with
limz→−∞ h (z) = −∞ and limz→∞ h (z) =∞
We will give h (z) an interpretation momentarily; for now we note that (H) is implied by
logconcavity of f . Together, the combination of conditions (QC) and (H), which is weaker than
logconcavity of f , suﬃces for most of the results that follow.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (QC) and (H) hold. Fix Aμ, σL, and σH . There exists u˜ such
that a firm that anticipates a consumer cutoﬀ rule u¯ will choose σL if u¯ < u˜, will choose σH if
u¯ > u˜, and will be indiﬀerent if u¯ = u˜.
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Intuitively, fixing u¯, a firm with a generic product σL will tend to sell to a larger fraction
of visiting consumers than a firm with a niche product σH . (That is, 1 − F (zL (u¯)) > 1 −
F (zH (u¯)).)16 Suppose that firms’ expectation of u¯ rises by du. A firm that adjusts to this
change by reducing its price by du so as to maintain the same level of sales will endure a profit
decline proportional to its sales volume — this hurts the generic firm more than the nichy one. Of
course, a firm could respond to more selective consumers with a mixture of price and quantity
adjustments rather than just a price adjustment, but the envelope theorem implies that the
decline in the firm’s profit will be the same.
Proposition 2 implies that a mixed equilibrium, with both generic and nichy firms, is only
possible if consumers’ equilibrium cutoﬀ utility is u˜. If consumers are more or less selective
than this in equilibrium, then all firms will be nichy or generic, respectively.
How do a consumer’s beliefs (λe,pe) about product design and prices aﬀect her optimal utility
cutoﬀ u¯ ?
Write u¯ (λe,pe ; c) for the consumer’s optimal utility cutoﬀ, given these beliefs and the
search cost c. We are interested in the sign of du¯(λ
e,pe ;c)
dλeH : does a greater prevalence of nichy
firms induce consumers to be more or less choosy? It turns out that we can analyze this question
by looking at consumer utility in the boundary cases, when all firms have the same σ.
Lemma 3 Let u¯L (pe ; c) = u¯ (λe,pe ; c)|(λeL,λeH)=(1,0) and u¯H (pe ; c) = u¯ (λe,pe ; c)|(λeL,λeH)=(0,1).
For any λe, du¯(λe,pe ;c)dλeH has the same sign as u¯H (pe ; c)− u¯L (pe ; c).
The logic of the lemma is essentially the following. The expected benefit from an additional
search that happens to reach a σL or σH firm is σLI (z¯L) or σHI (z¯H) respectively. Equation (10)
states that the weighted average of these benefits must equal c; however σLI (z¯L) and σHI (z¯H)
need not be (and generally, will not be) equal to each other. If σHI (z¯H) > c > σLI (z¯L), then
an increase in the fraction of idiosyncratic firms improves the overall expected benefit from
search, inducing the consumer to hold out for a higher u¯. It turns out that that whenever this
is true, we also have u¯H (pe ; c) > u¯ (λe,pe ; c) > u¯L (pe ; c).
In order to compare consumer utility with all σL firms pricing at peL, versus all σH firms
pricing at peH , it is useful to introduce an auxiliary function v (σ; c) defined by
σI
µ
v (σ; c)−Aμ
σ
¶
= c (11)
This function corresponds to the optimal consumer cutoﬀ under the assumption that all firms
choose strategy (σ, 0). We are not interested a situation with zero prices per se, but v (σ; c)
provides a convenient way to express consumer utility in our two cases of interest. Given the
implicit definitions of u¯L (pe ; c), u¯H (pe ; c), and v (σ; c), we have u¯L (pe ; c) = v (σL; c)−peL and
u¯H (p
e ; c) = v (σH ; c)− peH . This means that the change in consumer search induced by a shift
from a generic to a nichy market can be characterized by
u¯H (p
e ; c)− u¯L (pe ; c) = [v (σH ; c)− v (σL; c)]− [peH − peL]
The diﬀerence between a consumer’s choosiness when she expects a nichy versus a generic
market can be separated into a term related to product design σ and a price term. Lemma 4
16This is intuitive but not self-evident — Lemma 3 provides suﬃcient conditions for it to be true.
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shows that the first term is unambiguously positive: if consumers expect the same price when
all firms choose σH as they do when all firms choose σL, then they will hold out for higher
utility in the nichier market. Moreover, if the upper bound σH on the nichiness of products
increases, this utility gain grows at an increasing rate.
Lemma 4 The function v (σ; c) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in σ. Consequently,
v (σH ; c)− v (σL; c) > 0.
Proof. For v (σ; c) strictly increasing, let z (σ; c) be defined by σI (z (σ; c)) = c, so that
v (σ; c) = Aμ + σz (σ; c), and diﬀerentiate to get17
∂v (σ; c)
∂σ = z (σ; c) +
I (z (σ; c))
1− F (z (σ; c))
= z (σ; c) +E (z − z (σ; c) | z > z (σ; c))
= E (z | z > z (σ; c)) > E (z) = 0 .
For convexity, see the appendix.
The logic is essentially an option value argument. Increasing σ does not change the expected
value E (Aμ + σz) of a random consumer-firm match, but it does make good matches better
and bad matches worse. However, a consumer is not aﬀected by the deterioration of very bad
matches (z < z (σ; c)) because she would not have accepted them anyway. Thus, the average
eﬀect of higher σ on the truncated set of matches she does accept is positive.
Together, Lemmas 3 and 4 also imply that a consumer who expects a mixture of σL and
σH firms will unambiguously benefit if the share of σH firms rises, as long as σH firms are not
expected to charge higher prices than σL firms. On the other hand, if peH > peL, it is not clear
whether or not a shift toward more idiosyncratic firms benefits consumers or not — the answer
depends in some sense on what share of the gains v (σH ; c) − v (σL; c) that firms are able to
extract through higher prices. We will come back to this point later.
We can sum up the main partial equilibrium conclusions thus far as follows. Lower search
costs encourage consumers to search longer and hold out for a higher cutoﬀ utility u¯. Firms that
expect to face more discriminating consumers (higher u¯) are induced to switch from generic
(σL) to more idiosyncratic (σH) products. Consumers who expect more idiosyncratic products
are in turn induced to hold out for even higher utility as long as the price premium demanded
for those idiosyncratic products is not too large. We are now prepared to characterize equilibria
of the model. Define a function U (c,σ) = Aμ + σh ¡I−1 ¡ cσ¢¢.
Lemma 5 U (c,σ) is strictly decreasing in c, with limc→0 U (c,σ) =∞ and limc→∞ U (c,σ) =
−∞. If an EDE exists in which all firms choose σ = σS, then the consumer utility cutoﬀ in
that EDE must be U (c,σS).
Proof. I is strictly decreasing and thus invertible. The monotonicity of U follows from
I strictly decreasing and h strictly increasing. The limits follow from (H) and the fact that
I−1
¡
c
σ
¢
tends to ∞ or −∞ as c → 0 or c → ∞ respectively. If the stipulated equilibrium
exists, then applying (10) and (9), it must satisfy σSI (z¯) = c and p = σS 1−F (z¯)f(z¯) , for z¯ =
17For the second line, reverse the integration by parts from Section 2.
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u¯+p−Aμ
σS . The first equation requires that z¯ = I
−1
³
cσS
´
. Using the equation for p, we have
u¯ = Aμ + σS
³
z¯ − 1−F (z¯)f(z¯)
´
= Aμ + σSh (z¯). Together, these show that equilibrium utility must
be U (c,σS).
Lemma 5 is of interest principally for the cases σS = σL or σH , since we know that no
other level of σ can be optimal for a firm. The next proposition characterizes equilibria of
the model in terms of threshold values of U (c,σL) and U (c,σH). This highlights one of the
technical diﬃculties introduced by the fact that optimal product design is extreme: the nature
of equilibrium can depend on discrete diﬀerences between these two functions that are diﬃcult
to characterize in much generality. If an interior choice of σ had turned out to be optimal for
firms, then the nature of the equilibrium would be related to a first order condition of U (c,σ)
with respect to σ, and this might lend itself to more definitive conclusions.
Proposition 3 Fix Aμ, σL, and σH . Let u˜ be the threshold utility, as described in Proposition
2, that makes a firm indiﬀerent between σL and σH .
i) If u˜ < 0, then
a) Define c1 by U (c1,σH) = 0. An EDE with all firms choosing σH and consumer
cutoﬀ utility U (c,σH) ≥ 0 exists iﬀ c ∈ (0, c1].
b) No other EDE exists for any value of c.
ii) If u˜ ≥ 0, then
a) Define c2 by U (c2,σH) = u˜. An EDE with all firms choosing σH and consumer
cutoﬀ utility U (c,σH) ≥ u˜ exists iﬀ c ∈ (0, c2].
b) Define c3 and c4 by U (c3,σL) = u˜ and U (c4,σL) = 0, with c3 ≤ c4. An EDE with
all firms choosing σL and consumer cutoﬀ utility U (c,σL) ≤ u˜ exists iﬀ c ∈ [c3, c4].
c) An asymmetric EDE with some firms choosing σL, the remaining firms choosing
σH , and consumer cutoﬀ utility u¯ = u˜ exists if c ∈ (min (c2, c3) ,max (c2, c3)).
d) No other EDE exists for any value of c.
iii) The cost thresholds c1 and c4 rise with an increase in the mean value of a product Aμ.
However, thresholds c2 and c3 are invariant to Aμ.
A few remarks may help to illuminate this characterization of equilibrium. First, note that
for small enough search costs (c ≤ c1 if u˜ < 0, or c < min (c2, c3) if u˜ ≥ 0), there is a unique
equilibrium with all firms choosing nichy products. This appears to reflect the feedback loop
described above: cheap search encourages choosy consumers; this turns firms toward nichy
products which reinforces consumer choosiness. Second, consider large search costs. For c
large enough (c > c1 if u˜ < 0 or c > c4 if u˜ > 0), no equilibrium with search exists because
consumers do not anticipate realizing enough surplus from a purchase to cover their costs. The
higher the mean value of a product Aμ, then (by part (iii)), the larger the range of costs c for
which an equilibrium with search can be sustained. This is because the strength of competition
(as measured inversely by search frictions), not Aμ, is the binding constraint on how much
surplus a firm can extract from consumers via a higher price. If Aμ is suﬃciently large (so
that c4 > c2), then for moderately high search costs c ∈ (max (c2, c3) , c4), there is a unique
equilibrium with all firms choosing generic products. This appears to be the flip side of the
feedback loop discussed above: high c discourages consumer search, given this, firms prefer to
oﬀer generic products, and this discourages search further. In these interpretations, “appears”
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is intended as a reminder that one segment of this loop — higher σ encouraging choosier search
— only applies if prices do not rise too fast with σ, and we have not showed that this must
happen.
For intermediate search costs between c2 and c3, there are three main possibilities. (To
simplify the discussion, assume Aμ large enough (c4 > c2) to be sure that an equilibrium
exists.) If c2 > c3, then for c ∈ (c3, c2) there are three EDEs: one nichy, one generic, and an
asymmetric EDE with both σL and σH firms. In this case, the feedback loop does apply: it
is what generates the multiplicity. In the σL equilibrium, consumers are not choosy enough to
make it worthwhile for any single firm to deviate to σH . However, if consumers expect all firms
to oﬀer σH products, they will be suﬃciently more discriminating that σH becomes optimal
for firms. The asymmetric EDE in this case is unconvincing, as it fails standard notions of
stability.18
Alternatively, if c2 < c3, then for search costs in the range c ∈ (c2, c3) there is a unique, and
asymmetric, equilibrium. If and when this case applies, the weak link in our feedback story
must fail. That is, if consumers expect all products to be generic, they are still choosy enough
that firms would prefer to deviate to σH and price substantially higher. However, if consumers
expected all firms to shift to σH , the price hike would more than wipe out the potential utility
gains described in Lemma 4, inducing consumers to settle for lower utility — low enough that
firms would want to switch back to σL.
The third possibility is the knife edge case c2 = c3. In this case, as search costs fall from c4
down to zero, the market shifts immediately from a unique generic equilibrium for c > c2 = c3 to
a unique nichy equilibrium for c < c2 = c3. Given a distribution F and the other parameters,
one can compute c2 and c3 (either analytically or numerically) to determine which of these
three regimes applies; however there does not appear to be any straightforward and general
classification. Computed examples demonstrate that all three regimes (multiple equilibrium, a
unique asymmetric equilibrium, or the knife-edge transition) are possible. A priori one might
imagine, based perhaps on assumptions about genericity, that the first two regimes would
apply to more distributions and parameters than the third. Somewhat surprisingly, that is not
necessarily true — many common distributions generate the knife edge case. The reason why
has to do with how firms and consumers split the change in total surplus generated by shifting
to more idiosyncratic products. It turns out that for these distributions, the split is such that
consumer surplus and firm profits ‘agree’ about whether shifting to more idiosyncratic products
is advantageous.
Definition 3 The taste distribution f (z) is inverse hazard rate invariant (IHRI) if its inverse
hazard rate υ (z) = 1−F (z)f(z) satisfies the following condition for some positive constant K:
E (υ (z) | z ≥ z¯) = Kυ (z¯)
This condition says the ratio of the inverse hazard rate’s value at a point to its average
value to the right of that point does not depend on which point we choose. Distributions
satisfying the IHRI condition include everything in the generalized Pareto family, such as the
18 Informally, if consumers expected a slightly higher fraction of σH firms, their optimal cutoﬀ utility would
rise above u˜; encouraging the shift toward σH . Similarly, a rise in the fraction of σL firms would tend to snowball
toward the all-σL equilibrium.
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uniform distribution, distributions with triangular densities, the exponential distribution, and
distributions with right tails that obey power laws.19 If tastes are inverse hazard rate invariant,
we have the following sharp result.
Proposition 4 If f (z) is inverse hazard rate invariant, then c2 = c3. That is, if an EDE exists,
then it is generically unique and involves minimal diﬀerentiation by all firms for c > c2 = c3
and maximal diﬀerentiation by all firms for c < c2 = c3.
While the following result is helpful in proving Proposition 6, it is also interesting in its own
right.
Proposition 5 If f (z) is inverse hazard rate invariant with constant K, then firm profits in
any equilibrium are equal to cK .
The next proposition clarifies the way in which consumers’ and firms’ (equilibrium) prefer-
ences about σ are aligned for an IHRI distribution, thereby generating the shift from a unique
σL equilibrium to a unique σH equilibrium as c falls. Call the threshold cost c¯ = c2 = c3.
Proposition 6 If f (z) is inverse hazard rate invariant, then U (c,σH) > U (c,σL) > u˜ for
c < c¯ and U (c,σH) < U (c,σL) < u˜ for c > c¯. Therefore, for any search cost c, consumers’
EDE utility attains the maximum of {U (c,σH) , U (c,σL)}.
Proposition 6 tells us that given optimal pricing by firms, consumers prefer an all σH market
over an all σL if and only if their cutoﬀ utility is such that firms prefer σH too. (And similarly
for σL.) What is it about the taste distribution that aligns firm and consumer interests in this
way? Notice that the expectation over the right tail of υ (z) can be rewritten (integrating by
parts) as follows:
E (υ (z) | z ≥ z¯) = E (z − z¯ | z ≥ z¯)
The righthand expression is related to the surplus that the average consumer receives when she
finally buys, relative to the marginal consumer who buys. In this sense, consumer surplus is
linked to the area under υ (z) to the right of z¯. Meanwhile, a firm’s optimal price is proportional
to υ (z¯) = 1−F (z¯)f(z¯) . Thus the relationship between firm and consumer surplus is connected to
the relationship between υ (z¯) and its right tail. If this relationship does not depend on z¯, then
when an individual firm changes σ (thereby shifting its marginal consumer), the change will
tend to move its own profits and utility in lockstep.20 Proposition 7 states that even though
individual firms’ gains from shifting σ may be aligned with improvements in consumer utility,
those profit gains are fully dissipated when all firms follow suit.
When the taste distribution does not satisfy inverse hazard rate invariance, Proposition 4 can
still oﬀer intuition about whether to expect multiple symmetric equilibria or a single asymmetric
one for intermediate search costs. Shifting from generic to nichy products always tends to push
consumers further into the right tail of the taste distribution. If E(υ(z) | z≥z¯)υ(z¯) increases with z¯,
then based on the arguments above, as search costs decline, we might expect consumers to
19Of course, for distributions of the form F (z) = 1−z−a, we need the expectation in the definition to converge,
so we must have a > 1.
20This is quite informal; readers should consult the proof of Proposition 4 for a more rigorous statement of
this connection.
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begin to favor nichy products earlier (for higher c) before it becomes more profitable for any
individual firm to oﬀer one. (That is, there may be c such that U (c,σL) < U (c,σH) < u˜.)
In this case, multiple equilibria would arise. Alternatively, if E(υ(z) | z≥z¯)υ(z¯) declines with z¯, then
firms may be more eager than consumers to switch to σH , because they are able to extract a
larger share of the surplus from sales to consumers who are further into the right tail of the taste
distribution. In this case, one could see asymmetric equilibria for intermediate search costs.
For most commonly used distributions, the ratio E(υ(z) | z≥z¯)υ(z¯) is either constant or increasing in
z¯. For example, the ratio is increasing for distributions often used in discrete choice settings
such as the normal, logistic, and generalized extreme value distributions. On the other hand,
it is rather diﬃcult to construct distributions for which this ratio is decreasing.21
3.1 Eﬃciency
Neither consumers nor firms fully internalize the eﬀects of their choices. Consumers do not
account for the fact that by searching more assiduously they tend to encourage more idio-
syncratic products, which may benefit other consumers. Meanwhile, individual firms do not
consider how, collectively, their product design decisions induce changes in consumer selectiv-
ity that feed back into profits. Furthermore, the search frictions shift bargaining power from
consumers to firms by depressing the consumer’s outside option. In view of these distortions,
it is perhaps surprising that under some circumstances the search equilibrium will turn out to
be constrained eﬃcient.
Throughout this section, we assume Aμ large enough that it is optimal to participate in
search. Define total social surplus as the sum of consumer utility and firm profits, all measured
on a per-consumer basis.
Proposition 7 An assessment maximizes the total social surplus if i) all firms choose σH ,
ii) prices form a best response to consumer cutoﬀ utility, and iii) consumer cutoﬀ utility is a
best response to σH and firms’ prices. Therefore, for small search costs, the unique EDE is
constrained eﬃcient.
To understand this result, consider the potential sources of ineﬃciency: distortions of prices,
product design σ, or consumer search intensity away from their eﬃcient levels. Because of the
unit demand assumption, prices simply transfer surplus between consumers and firms; they
cause no quantity distortions unless they are so high that they deter consumers from searching.
Eﬃciency favors idiosyncratic products for reasons similar to Lemma 4: higher dispersion makes
good firm-consumer matches better and bad matches worse, but the latter can be rejected in
favor of continued search. As for consumer search, a consumer’s objective function diﬀers from
a social planner’s because the former considers not just the quality of a match, but also its price
in deciding whether to buy or keep searching. However, because an all σH equilibrium involves
no price dispersion across firms, the fact that consumers care about price does not distort their
search process away from what a social planner would choose.
21 Interested readers can consult our working paper for examples that fit this intuition. For multiple equilibria,
F (z) = e
kz
1+ekz
will work. For a unique, asymmetric equilibrium simple examples are hard to find, but the
following will work: F (z) = F˜
¡
z + e−1
¢
with support on z ∈ £−e−1, 1− e−1¤, where F˜ (x) = 1− (1− x) e−x for
x ∈ [0, 1]. Other distributions that generate the asymmetric equilibrium case are similarly labored, suggesting
that this case should not be viewed as a common outcome in our model.
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Along with the fact that equilibria with generic products will be constrained ineﬃcient,
this result suggests a new twist to the standard explanation of how a market with friction
approaches a competitive benchmark as that friction shrinks. As search frictions diminish, our
search equilibrium approaches a full information competitive equilibrium through two chan-
nels. The standard channel might be considered technological: as search costs decrease, the
constrained optimal allocation of goods approaches the true optimum. The new channel, as
outlined by Proposition 3, is more strategic: as consumer information improves, product dif-
ferentiation endogenously shifts toward its eﬃcient level. This also adds a nuance to results for
homogeneous goods that predict that improvements in consumer information will drive prices
down to marginal cost: here prices do not fall because diﬀerentiation provides an escape valve
for the pressure applied by better information.
This result would be weaker if there were more sources of ineﬃciency in the model. For
example, suppose that rather than unit demand, each consumer has a downward sloping demand
curve.22 In this case, an equilibrium price above marginal cost would generate the standard
downward distortion of quantities purchased. If it were true in this revised model (as is often
the case in our current model) that prices are higher in a nichy equilibrium than in a generic
one, then a social surplus comparison could involve competing eﬀects. A consumer might end
up with a better-suited product in the nichy equilibrium, but buy relatively less of it (due to
the price distortion) than she would have had the equilibrium been generic. Other factors that
could work against idiosyncratic products are costs for unsold inventory, or the possibility for
a consumer of running out of options, if the number of firms were finite.
4 Extensions
In order to present the main results of the paper with as much clarity as possible, our model
stripped away many elements of the product design process for firms. In this section, we
discuss how two of these elements — quality improvements and multi-product firms, could be
incorporated back into the model.
Firms that control both the mean and variance of consumer valuations
Our model focuses on product design choices that aﬀect the dispersion of consumers’ valu-
ations for a product around a mean Aμ. We have set aside what may seem to be more basic
questions: how much should a firm invest in improving the average value of its product to
consumers, and how does consumer search aﬀect this decision? We briefly sketch a version of
the model that addresses these question. Suppose that when a firm chooses σ and p, it also
chooses Aμ ∈ [0,∞). Just as with σ and p, consumers do not observe the values of Aμ that
firms choose before searching, but consumers do form beliefs about Aμ that must be correct in
equilibrium. One can interpret the pair (Aμ,σ) as a decomposition of the firm’s product into
a quality dimension (Aμ) about which consumers agree, and a taste dimension (σ) on which
opinions diﬀer. For example, for a car, higher σ might represent bolder styling that some con-
sumers love and others hate, while higher Aμ might represent better fuel economy.23 Suppose
the cost of supplying a product of mean value Aμ is w (Aμ) per unit, with w (0) = w0 (0) = 0
22 I thank a referee for bringing this point to my attention.
23The assumption that a firm can choose Aμ and σ independently is a convenient fiction; in practice many
changes to a product will probably aﬀect Aμ and σ simultaneously.
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and w strictly convex. A firm that anticipates consumers searching according to cutoﬀ utility
u¯ faces the revised profit maximization problem:
max
(σ,Aμ,p)
(pm − w (Aμ)) (1− F ( u¯−Aμ + pσ )) .
The logic of Lemma 2 extends, so the firm’s optimal level of σ will still be σL or σH . More
interesting is the interplay between Aμ and p, which substitute one-for-one for one another in the
firm’s probability of a sale. Suppose the firm considers raising its price by a small amount ε and
‘sterilizing’ the price increase by also improving Aμ by ε. This change leaves the probability of a
sale unaﬀected, and changes the profit margin on each unit sold by ε−w0 (Aμ) ε. If w0 (Aμ) < 1,
this change improves profits, while if w0 (Aμ) > 1, a reduction in both p and Aμ would improve
profits. Thus the optimal strategy for the firm must satisfy w0 (Aμ) = 1, but this pins down the
firm’s optimal quality level Aμ.24 Importantly, the firm’s optimal choice of Aμ is determined
entirely by the marginal cost of improving quality; the expected consumer cutoﬀ utility u¯, and
the firm’s choices about σ and p do not aﬀect this at all. Suppose A∗μ is this optimal quality
level, with w0
¡
A∗μ
¢
= 1. The model in which firms choose Aμ endogenously can eﬀectively be
treated as a special case of the original model in which Aμ is fixed exogenously at A∗μ and firms
face a production cost of w
¡
A∗μ
¢
per unit. (While the original model was presented using a
zero unit cost for firms, none of the results hinged on this assumption.)
As a result, it is perfectly acceptable to interpret the main results of the paper as applying to
a situation in which product design aﬀects both the mean and the variance of consumer values
for a firm’s product. We should note that the simplicity of the role played by the endogenous
choice of Aμ would not necessarily carry through under alternative modeling assumptions. For
example, in the case of the car, one might imagine that improving fuel economy entails not
just per unit costs, but also some fixed costs such as research. We do not formally analyze
the case in which choosing Aμ incurs a cost regardless of the number of units sold, but one
might conjecture that in this case, a firm will tend to invest in higher Aμ when it is planning to
produce a relatively generic (low σ) product that it expects to sell in relatively high quantities.
Multi-product firms
In practice, many firms oﬀer not just one product, but a line of several related products.
Part of the appeal of oﬀering a broad product line may be that it allows a firm to hedge against
uncertain consumer tastes — a consumer only needs to like at least one of the firm’s products
to make a sale. Furthermore, this hedging eﬀect disproportionately helps firms that sell very
polarizing (high σ) products, since these are precisely the firms that fail to convert most of
their visitors to sales in the single product case. Thus, one might expect that in a model with
multi-product firms, the market switches over from generic to nichy products earlier (than in
the single product model) as search costs fall.
To examine this logic, we sketch a version of the model in which each firm can oﬀer up to
N diﬀerent products. For simplicity, we make the following assumptions. 1) A firm must set
the same level of σ, and the same price p, for all of its products. Thus a firm strategy is a
pair (σ, p) as before, plus a number of products n ∈ {1, ..., N}.25 2) Each consumer draws a
separate, independent taste shock z for each product oﬀered by a firm. 3) Consumer search is
24This fact can be seen easily, and a bit more formally, from the first order conditions for p and Aμ.
25We do not consider the endogenous choice of Aμ here.
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as described earlier except that when a consumer arrives at a firm, she learns her valuations for
all of the products it oﬀers (at no additional cost). She can buy any one of them or continue
her search at another firm. She does not observe a firm’s choices of n before visiting it.26 If she
continues to search, she visits another randomly chosen firm.27 4) A consumer still demands at
most one product. While these assumptions are restrictive — particularly Assumption 1, which
rules out the possibility of a single firm oﬀering both generic and nichy products — they have
the benefit of allowing us to frame the extension in terms of earlier results.
For additional simplicity, suppose that there are no additional costs associated with oﬀering
more than one product. In this case, we argue that it is self evident that each firm will choose
n = N . For a visiting consumer, there is only one of a firm’s N products that she might
actually purchase — that is the product for which she has the largest taste shock. Since a single
taste shock has distribution F (z), the largest of N independent taste shocks has distribution
F (z)N . Thus we can reinterpret this multiple product model as a version of our standard single
product model in which the taste shock of a consumer for a firm has distribution F (z)N rather
than F (z). This distribution no longer has mean zero, so our first definition of diﬀerentiation
(Proposition 1) no longer applies, but all of the other results carry through unchanged.28 In
particular, Proposition 2 applies: there is a threshold utility, which we denote u˜ (N), such
that a firm will be indiﬀerent between oﬀering N relatively generic products (σ = σL) versus
oﬀering N idiosyncratic products (σ = σH) if it expects consumers to use the utility cutoﬀ
u˜ (N). A firm that expects consumers to demand more (less) utility than u˜N will strictly prefer
σH (σL). The intuition sketched above suggests that u˜ (N) should decline with N : a firm with
a larger product line should be emboldened to oﬀer nichier products. Proposition 8 confirms
this intuition.
Proposition 8 Suppose that F (z)N satisfies Condition 2 for all N ≥ 1 and let u˜ (N) be the
expected consumer cutoﬀ utility at which a firm with N products is indiﬀerent between choosing
σL and σH . Then u˜ (N) is decreasing in N .
A reasonable conjecture would be that the range of search costs that can support a high
diﬀerentiation equilibrium grows with the number of products per firm, but we have not proved
this. One might also wonder how multiple product firms aﬀect the equilibrium regime (multiple
equilibria or one asymmetric equilibrium) that prevails at intermediate search costs. This is
diﬃcult to determine analytically, but based on Section 3, we conjecture that the right tail
behavior of the inverse hazard rate υN (z) = 1−F (z)NNf(z)F (z)N−1 may oﬀer some insight. Numerical
investigation suggests that the slope of E(υN (z) | z≥z¯)υN (z¯) with respect to z¯ tends to increase with
N for common distributions. For example, if υ (z) satisfies IHRI, then E(υN (z) | z≥z¯)υN (z¯) tends to
26Of course, in equilibrium, a consumer will form correct beliefs about the distribution of n across firms.
27This implies that a multi-product firm and a single product firm are equally likely to be visited. One
alternative version of random search would be for the consumer to pick a product randomly, and then visit
the firm that produces it, observing the firm’s entire product line. In this version, multi-product firms would
receive more consumer visits, augmenting the incentive for a firm to oﬀer multiple products. As an example of
this type of search, imagine a consumer who runs an online keyword search that reveals links to every available
product. She clicks through on one product link randomly, and this leads her to its manufacturer’s web site,
with information on the manufacturer’s entire product line.
28Let FN (z) = (F (z))
N , υN (z) = 1−FN (z)fN (z) , and hN (z) = z − υN (z). For earlier results to go through, FN
must satisfy Condition 2. This is straightforward if F is logconcave: FN inherits the logconcavity of F , and this
implies Condition 2. Otherwise, if F is not logconcave, then Condition 2 must be verified for FN directly.
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be increasing. Based on the arguments in Section 3, we speculate that this will tend to make
multiple equilibria more common as the number of products per firm increases. A formal
investigation of this is left to future work.
5 Concluding Remarks
In many ways, learning about diﬀerentiated products is a better motivation for the sequential
search model than learning about prices is. With the advent of new information-gathering
tools like the internet, for many goods it is diﬃcult to justify the assumption that prices are
hard to come by. It is the idiosyncrasies of those goods that make a persuasive case for search.
For example, discovering whether one likes the scent of a new perfume, the tradeoﬀ between
portability and cramped typing on a small laptop computer, or the prose style of a new author
generally requires taking some time to investigate the product. This may help to suggest
why Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), among others, find that pricing on the internet is not as
competitive as the easy availability of price information might suggest; they suggest that the
time costs of assessing fine print diﬀerentiated features like shipping and return policies or of
testing the benefits of site personalizations provide real barriers to competition.29 Our paper
takes a first step toward understanding how firms take consumer search into account when
designing products.
In order to focus on the interaction between diﬀerentiation and consumer search, the model
presented here excludes many other issues that it would be desirable to incorporate into future
analysis. As mentioned earlier, adding more channels for disseminating product information
(such as advertising), and giving consumers the opportunity to use publicly available informa-
tion to perform directed (rather than undirected) search, are two natural extensions. Based on
the analysis here, we would conjecture that to the extent that both of these activities improve
consumer information, they may tend to encourage greater product diﬀerentiation. However,
as suggested by recent work (Bagwell and Ramey (1996), Anderson and Renault (2006)), the
signaling introduced by advertising can have subtle eﬀects, and details (such as whether prices
are advertised, or product information, or both) may play a critical role. Understanding the
endogenous relationship between how a product is designed (i.e., diﬀerentiation) and how it is
marketed (price or product advertising) would be of great interest. We have also suppressed
any discussion of product quality, but incorporating choices over vertical diﬀerentiation would
be another logical step. The non-spatial taste shock model of diﬀerentiation used, and the
assumption of a continuum of firms, exclude some interesting oligopoly issues, such as whether
a firm should design its product to go head-to-head with some rival products while keeping its
distance from others. Extensions that allow for this type of “selective crowding” would also be
welcome.
29Similarly, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) find that vertical product diﬀerentiation and search costs can explain
substantial price dispersion in the seemingly homogeneous market for S&P 500 index funds. In our horizontal
diﬀerentiation setting, soft competition is manifested in the level of prices rather than dispersion.
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6 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
We have
Dmn(k) = Pr(|σmzm − σnzn| ≤ k)
=
Z ∞
−∞
Pr(zn ∈ [σmzm − kσn ,
σmzm + k
σn ]) f(zm)dzm
=
Z ∞
−∞
{F (σmzm + kσn )− F (
σmzm − k
σn )} f(zm)dzm
To show both directions of the if and only if, it suﬃces to show that Dmn(k) is strictly
decreasing in σm for all k. Diﬀerentiating with respect to σm:
dDmn(k)
dσm =
1
σn
Z ∞
−∞
zm{f(σmzm + kσn )− f(
σmzm − k
σn )} f(zm)dzm
Note that f(z) has a single peak at zero. (Logconcavity implies quasiconcavity, and symme-
try about a zero mean tells us where the peak is.) It follows directly that the term in brackets
is weakly negative when zm is positive, and vice versa. Formally, if zm is positive, then
σmzm − k
σn ∈ [−
σmzm + k
σn ,
σmzm + k
σn ]
so by quasiconcavity
f(
σmzm − k
σn ) ≥ min{f(−
σmzm + k
σn ), f(
σmzm + k
σn )} = f(
σmzm + k
σn )
and similarly for zm negative. It follows that the integrand is everywhere weakly nega-
tive. Furthermore the integrand must be strictly negative on a set of positive measure, so the
derivative is strictly negative. The result follows.
Proof of Lemma 1
Following the text, we seek to show that L (u¯) = c has a unique solution, where the function
L is defined in (2) and characterized in (3). First, we observe that L (u¯) is diﬀerentiable with
L0 (u¯) < 0. We have:
L0 (u¯) = −
Z
(σ,p)∈SB
I
µ
u¯+ p+Aμ
σ
¶
dB (σ, p)
The integrand is strictly positive for all (σ, p), so L0 (u¯) < 0 as claimed. Next, note that
L (u¯) < c for u¯ suﬃciently large. To show this, note that for u¯ > 0, we have u¯+p+Aμσ ≥ u¯σH for
all (σ, p), so
L (u¯) ≤
Z
(σ,p)∈SB
σHI
µ
u¯
σH
¶
dB (σ, p)
= σHI
µ
u¯
σH
¶
27
But by choosing u¯ large enough, we can make the righthand side arbitrarily small, so L (u¯) < c
for u¯ large enough.
Finally, we claim that L (u¯) > c for u¯ suﬃciently negative. Let p¯ = sup {p |B (σH , p) < 1} <
∞ be an upper bound on the prices the consumer expects to see. Let zˆ satisfy F (zˆ) = 12 , and
choose u¯ small enough that max
n
u¯+p¯+Aμ
σL ,
u¯+p¯+Aμ
σH
o
< zˆ − 4cσL . By construction, we have³
zˆ − u¯+p+Aμσ
´
> 4cσL for all (σ, p) ∈ supp(B). Then,
L (u¯) ≥
Z
(σ,p)∈SB
σL
Z zˆ
u¯+p+Aμ
σ
(1− F (z)) dz dB (σ, p)
≥
Z
(σ,p)∈SB
σL
Z zˆ
u¯+p+Aμ
σ
1
2
dz dB (σ, p)
≥
Z
(σ,p)∈SB
2c dB (σ, p) ≥ 2c ,
as claimed.
Together, L0 (u¯) < 0, L (u¯) < c for u¯ suﬃciently large, and L (u¯) > c for u¯ suﬃciently small
suﬃce to show that there exists a unique solution to L (u¯) = c.
The following lemmas are used in the proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma 6 The marginal utility z of the marginal consumer at a firm with diﬀerentiation σ
that is pricing optimally is increasing in the cutoﬀ level of utility u¯.
Proof. Fixing σ, we need z¯ increasing with u¯ in the following expression, but this is just
equivalent to Condition (H).
u¯ = Aμ + σ(z¯ − 1− F (z¯)
f(z¯)
) (12)
Recall that we have defined υ (z) = 1−F (z)f(z) .
Lemma 7 Let u0 = Aμ−σHυ (0) and u00 = Aμ−σLυ (0). For u¯ ∈ [u0, u00], we have z(σH ; u¯) >
z(σL; u¯). (That is, for any utility level in this range, a firm choosing σH sells to fewer consumers
than a firm choosing σL.)
Proof. Note that z (σH ;u0) = 0, so Lemma 6 implies that z (σH ; u¯) > 0 for u¯ > u0.
Similarly, z (σL;u00) = 0, so by Lemma 6, we have z (σL; u¯) < 0 for u¯ < u00.
Lemma 8 ∆(u¯) is negative for u¯ < u0 and positive for u¯ > u00.
Proof. From the last lemma, both z(σH ; u¯) and z(σL; u¯) are negative for u¯ < u0. Suppose
z(σH ; u¯) = ρ < 0. Then the profit to choosing σH is p∗(σH ; u¯)(1 − F (ρ)). Now imagine
switching to σL but leaving the price unchanged. The firm’s profit would then be p∗(σH ; u¯)(1−
F (
u¯+p∗(σH ;u¯)−AμσL )) = p
∗(σH ; u¯)(1 − F (σHσL ρ)) — an improvement because σHσL ρ < ρ. Switching
to σL and pricing optimally would be better still. This proves the first part.
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We also have both z(σH ; u¯) and z(σL; u¯) positive for u¯ > u00. By similar logic, we can show
that a firm using σL can always switch to σH and gain customers without changing its price,
proving the second part.
Proof of Proposition 2
A firm that expects u¯, chooses σL, and prices optimally earns
πL (u¯) = pL (u¯)
µ
(1− F ( u¯−Aμ + pL(u¯)σL )
¶
As consumers become more selective, this profit changes according to (applying the envelope
theorem)
dπL(u¯)
du¯
= −pL (u¯)σL f
µ
u¯−Aμ + pL(u¯)
σL
¶
Using the equation (9) for the optimal price, we can write this as
dπL(u¯)
du¯
= −(1− F (zL(u¯))
where zL (u¯) =
u¯−Aμ+pL(u¯)σL . Similarly, for a firm choosing σH , we have dπH(u¯)du¯ = −(1−F (zH(u¯)).
Define ∆(u¯) = πH (u¯)−πL(u¯) to be the diﬀerence between the profits to σH and σL (assuming
optimal pricing in either case). Lemma 4 (in the appendix) demonstrates that there are utility
levels u0 and u00 such that ∆ (u¯) is negative for u¯ < u0 and positive for u¯ > u00. Thus for
consumer utility suﬃciently low (high) σL (respectively σH) is optimal. To show that there is
a unique u˜ ∈ (u0, u00) at which the optimal product choice switches from σL to σH , note that
d∆(u¯)
du¯
= F (zH(u¯))− F (zL(u¯))
Lemma 3 demonstrates that for the same u0 and u00, any u¯ ∈ [u0, u00] satisfies zH (u¯) > zL (u¯).
Thus d∆(u¯)du¯ is strictly positive on [u0, u00], which suﬃces to prove the claim.
Proof of Lemma 3
Using (10),
du¯ (λe,pe ; c)
dλeH =
σHI (zH)− σLI (zL)
λL (1− F (zL)) + λH (1− F (zH))
where
zS =
u¯ (λe,pe ; c) + peS −Aμ
σS , S = L,H .
So sgn
³
du¯(λe,pe ;c)
dλeH
´
= sgn (σHI (zH)− σLI (zL)). Equation (10) tells us that a convex com-
bination of σLI (zL) and σHI (zH) equals c. Thus, σHI (zH) > σLI (zL) is equivalent to
σHI (zH) > c > σLI (zL). Likewise, (σHI (zH) < σLI (zL)) ⇔ (σHI (zH) < c < σLI (zL)),
and (σHI (zH) = σLI (zL))⇔ (σHI (zH) = c = σLI (zL)).
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Next, note that u¯H (pe ; c) and u¯L (pe ; c) are defined by
σHI (z˜H) = c , where z˜H = u¯H (p
e ; c) + peH −Aμ
σH , and
σLI (z˜L) = c , where z˜L = u¯L (p
e ; c) + peL −Aμ
σL
Recall that I is a strictly decreasing function, so σHI (zH) > c > σLI (zL) is true if and only
if z˜H > zH and z˜L < zL. But this in turn is equivalent to u¯H (pe ; c) > u¯ (λe,pe ; c) and
u¯L (p
e ; c) < u¯ (λe,pe ; c). Thus, du¯(λe,pe ;c)dλeH > 0 is equivalent to u¯H (pe ; c)− u¯L (pe ; c) > 0. The
equivalences for du¯(λ
e,pe ;c)
dλeH = 0 and
du¯(λe,pe ;c)
dλeH < 0 follow in exactly the same way.
Proof of Lemma 4
For v (σ; c) strictly convex, note that ∂v(σ;c)∂σ = z (σ; c) + I(z(σ;c))1−F (z(σ;c)) depends on σ only
through z (σ; c). Diﬀerentiate to get
∂2v (σ; c)
∂σ2 =
∂
∂z
µ
z +
I (z)
1− F (z)
¶
· ∂z (σ; c)∂σ
=
f (z) I (z)
(1− F (z))2
¯¯¯¯
z=z(σ;c)
∂z (σ; c)
∂σ
Next, diﬀerentiate the definition of z (σ; c) implicitly to get ∂z(σ;c)∂σ = 1σ I(z(σ;c))1−F (z(σ;c)) . So ∂
2v(σ;c)
∂σ2 =
1
σ
f(z)I(z)2
(1−F (z))3
¯¯¯
z=z(σ;c) which is strictly positive.
Proof of Proposition 3
By Lemma 2, no diﬀerentiation level σ except σL or σH can ever be a best response for a
firm. Furthermore, (QC) implies that in any equilibrium, all firms that choose the same value
of σ will set the same price, as determined by (9). Thus any potential equilibria can be classified
depending on whether all firms choose σL, all firms choose σH , or some fraction λL of firms
choose σL and the rest choose σH . We will take these three cases in turn.
EDE with all firms choosing σL
Note that the threshold u˜ is determined entirely by the parameters Aμ, σL, and σH and
the distribution F . An assessment with all firms choosing σL is an EDE if (by Lemma 5) the
consumer utility cutoﬀ satisfies u¯ = U (c,σL), if U (c,σL) ≥ 0 (consumers search rather than
exiting immediately), and if the choice of σL is optimal for a firm, given u¯ = U (c,σL) — this
last condition requires U (c,σL) ≤ u˜. (These conditions build in the requirement of correct
beliefs.) If u˜ < 0, the requirements that U (c,σL) ≥ 0 and U (c,σL) ≤ u˜ are incompatible; thus
no all-σL EDE exists. This is one step toward showing part (i.b). If u˜ ≥ 0, then the equilibrium
requirements can be satisfied if and only if 0 ≤ U (c,σL) ≤ u˜. By Lemma 5, there exist c3 and
c4 such that U (c3,σL) = u˜, U (c4,σL) = 0, and c3 ≤ c4. Then because U (c,σL) is strictly
decreasing in c, 0 ≤ U (c,σL) ≤ u˜ is satisfied if and only if c ∈ [c3, c4]. This demonstrates (ii.b).
EDE with all firms choosing σH
The logic for this case is similar to the previous one. Any equilibrium with all firms choosing
σH must have consumer cutoﬀ utility given by U (c,σH). For consumers to search rather
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than exit, we must have U (c,σH) ≥ 0, and for firms to prefer σH over σL, we must have
U (c,σH) ≥ u˜. If u˜ < 0, the first constraint (consumer participation) is the one that binds.
In this case, Lemma 5 guarantees that there exists c1 > 0 such that U (c1,σH) = 0, and
U (c,σH) ≥ 0 if and only if c ∈ (0, c1]. This suﬃces for (i.a). Alternatively, if u˜ ≥ 0, then
the second constraint (firm optimality) binds. Again, by Lemma 5, there exists c2 such that
U (c2,σH) = u˜, and U (c,σH) ≥ u˜ if and only if c ∈ (0, c2]. This suﬃces for (ii.a).
Asymmetric EDE
Consider an assessment in which a fraction λL of firms choose (σL, pL), the remaining λH
firms choose (σH , pH), and the consumer cutoﬀ utility is u¯. The equilibrium condition for firm
optimality requires that u¯ = u˜; otherwise either σL or σH would be strictly preferred. Consumer
participation requires u¯ ≥ 0, so if u˜ < 0, no such equilibrium can exist. Remember that u˜ is
determined entirely by parameters. Given u¯ = u˜, price optimality for firms requires that
p∗L = σL1− F (zL)f (zL) and p
∗
H = σH 1− F (zH)f (zH) , where z
∗
L =
u˜+ p∗L −Aμ
σL and z
∗
H =
u˜+ p∗H −Aμ
σH
Thus, prices p∗L and p∗H and marginal taste shocks z∗L and z∗H in such an equilibrium are entirely
pinned down by the parameters Aμ, σL, and σH . The equilibrium condition for consumers, given
correct expectations about firms, is then
λLσLI (z∗L) + λHσHI (z∗H) = c (13)
But σLI (z∗L) and σHI (z∗H) are pinned down by Aμ, σL, and σH . If σLI (z∗L) and σHI (z∗H)
are both strictly larger or both strictly smaller than c, then (13) cannot be satisfied, and no
asymmetric EDE exists. If σLI (z∗L) and σHI (z∗H) lie on opposite sides of c, then there is exactly
one pair (λ∗L,λ∗H), with λL + λH = 1, for which (13) can be satisfied. In this case, there is
exactly one asymmetric EDE, described by (λ∗L,λ∗H) and the strategies above. (More precisely,
there is one such equilibrium, up to relabelings of which firms choose σL or σH .)
Now, recalling the definition of U (), for U (c3,σL) = u˜ we have σLI (z)|z= u˜+p−AμσL = c3
and p = σL 1−F (z¯)f(z¯)
¯¯¯
z=
u˜+p−Aμ
σL
. By inspection, the p and z that satisfy these conditions are just
p∗L and z∗L. Thus we have σLI (z∗L) = c3, so σLI (z∗L) T c if and only if c3 T c. Similarly,
for U (c2,σL) = u˜, we have σHI (z∗H) = c2, and so σHI (z∗H) T c if and only if c2 T c.
Thus, if c > max (c2, c3) or c < min (c2, c3), then (13) cannot be satisfied by any (λL,λH). If
c ∈ (min (c2, c3) ,max (c2, c3)), then σLI (z∗L) and σHI (z∗H) lie on opposite sides of c. In this
case, the assessment is an EDE if and only if λLc3 + λHc2 = c, or equivalently, for (λ∗L,λ∗H) =³ |c2−c|
|c3−c2| ,
|c3−c|
|c3−c2|
´
. (This equilibrium degenerates to full weight on σL or σH at the boundary
cases c = min (c2, c3) or c = max (c2, c3).) This establishes part (ii.c).
This enumeration exhausts all the possible EDEs, so we are done with parts (i) and (ii). For
part (iii), we claim that u˜ and U (c,σ) both move one-for-one with changes in Aμ. To clarify the
relationship, rewrite these variables as u˜ (Aμ) and U (c,σ;Aμ) to emphasize their dependence
on Aμ. The claim is that u˜
¡
A0μ
¢−A0μ = u˜ (Aμ)−Aμ and U ¡c,σ;A0μ¢−A0μ = U (c,σ;Aμ)−Aμ
for any Aμ and A0μ. To see this for u˜ (Aμ), note that the profit equivalence that defines it,
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πL (u˜ (Aμ)) = πH (u˜ (Aμ)) can be written (using (9))
p (1− F (z))|
z=
u˜(Aμ)−Aμ+p
σL ,p=σL
1−F (z)
f(z)
= p (1− F (z))|
z=
u˜(Aμ)−Aμ+p
σH ,p=σH
1−F (z)
f(z)
which depends only on the quantity (u˜ (Aμ)−Aμ), not on u˜ (Aμ) and Aμ separately. For
U (c,σ;Aμ) we have U (c,σ;Aμ)−Aμ = σh ¡I−1 ¡ cσ¢¢ which is obviously invariant to changes in
Aμ. Together, these imply that U (c,σ;Aμ)− u˜ (Aμ) = U ¡c,σ;A0μ¢− u˜ ¡A0μ¢ for any Aμ and A0μ,
so changes in Aμ do not aﬀect c2 and c3. On the other hand, for c1 defined by U (c1,σH ;Aμ) = 0,
since U is decreasing in c, it is straightforward that c1 must rise if Aμ rises. (And similarly for
c4.)
Proof of Proposition 4
It suﬃces to show that if U (c2,σH) = U (c3,σL) = u˜, then c2 = c3. Start with firms. A firm
that anticipates consumer utility u˜ and chooses σL will set a price, and therefore the marginal
taste shock zL (u˜) that it sells to, according to pL (u˜) = σL 1−F (zL(u˜))f(zL(u˜)) , where zL (u˜) satisfies
u˜ = Aμ+σLzL (u˜)− pL (u˜). The last equation can be written u˜ = Aμ+σLh (zL (u˜)). This firm
earns profit σL (1−F (zL(u˜)))2f(zL(u˜)) . Similarly, a firm that chooses σH instead will sell to a marginal
consumer determined by u˜ = Aμ+σHh (zH (u˜)) and earn profit σH (1−F (zH(u˜)))2f(zH(u˜)) . Because firms
are indiﬀerent between σL and σH at u˜, we have
u˜ = Aμ + σLh (zL (u˜)) = Aμ + σHh (zH (u˜)) and
σL (1− F (z))
2
f (z)
¯¯¯¯
¯
z=zL(u˜)
= σH (1− F (z))
2
f (z)
¯¯¯¯
¯
z=zH(u˜)
Now consider consumers. If c3 satisfies u˜ = U (c3,σL) ≡ Aμ + σLh
³
I−1
³
c3σL
´´
, then
(given the previous line and strict monotonicity of h), we have I−1
³
c3σL
´
= zL (u˜), and thus
c3 = σLI (zL (u˜)). By the same steps for U (c2,σH), we have c2 = σHI (zH (u˜)). Now use
inverse hazard rate invariance. Suppose that E(υ(z) | z≥z¯)υ(z¯) =
I(z¯)
(1−F (z¯))2/f(z¯) = K, or equivalently,
I (z) = K (1−F (z))
2
f(z) . Plugging this in, we have
c3 = KσL (1− F (z))
2
f (z)
¯¯¯¯
¯
z=zL(u˜)
and c2 = KσH (1− F (z))
2
f (z)
¯¯¯¯
¯
z=zH(u˜)
But the righthand sides are equal, so we have cL = cH as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 5
Given Proposition 4, all equilibria involve all firms choosing σL or all firms choosing σH .
Fix a common level of dispersion σ ∈ {σL,σH} for firms. In an equilibrium, the marginal
consumer type z¯ is uniquely defined by σI (z¯) = c. A firm’s optimal price is p = συ (z¯), and its
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equilibrium profit is
p (1− F (z¯)) = συ (z¯) (1− F (z¯))
= c
υ (z¯) (1− F (z¯))
I (z¯)
= c
υ (z¯)
E (υ (z) | z ≥ z¯)
=
c
K
since the righthand side, by assumption, does not vary with z¯.
Proof of Proposition 6
Define zL (c) to be the marginal consumer in an all σL assessment in which firms price
optimally with respect to consumers, and consumers search optimally with respect to firms.
Consumer utility in this profile is U (c,σL) = Aμ + σLh (zL (c)) where zL (c) is determined by
σLI (zL (c)) = c. (If U (c,σL) ≤ u˜, so that σL is optimal for firms, this assessment is an EDE.
Otherwise, it is not.) Define the function J (z) = h(z)I(z) so that we can write consumer utility in
this profile as
U (c,σL) = Aμ + cJ (zL (c))
Define zH (c) similarly for an all σH assessment; then we also have U (c,σH) = Aμ+cJ (zH (c)).
We will now demonstrate three claims about zL (c), zH (c), and J (z).
Claim 1 zL (c) < zH (c)
This follows directly from I 0 < 0 and σH > σL.
Claim 2 zL (c) and zH (c) are both strictly decreasing in c.
Again, this follows from I 0 < 0.
Claim 3 If f (z) is inverse hazard rate invariant, then J (z) is strictly quasiconvex, with a
minimum at z = 0.
Let E(υ(z) | z≥z¯)υ(z¯) =
I(z¯)f(z¯)
(1−F (z¯))2 = K, as usual. We have J (z) =
z
I(z) − 1K 11−F (z) , and therefore
J 0 (z) =
I (z) + (1− F (z)) z
I (z)2
− 1
K
f (z)
(1− F (z))2
=
I (z) + (1− F (z)) z
I (z)2
− 1
I (z)
=
(1− F (z))
I (z)2
z
so J (z) is strictly decreasing for z < 0 and strictly increasing for z > 0.
From Lemma 5, there exists some c¯ such that U (c¯,σL) = U (c¯,σH) = u˜. Thus we
have J (zL (c¯)) = J (zH (c¯)), and by Claim 3, zL (c¯) < 0 < zH (c¯). Then for any c >
c¯, we have zH (c) ∈ (zL (c) , zH (c¯)) by Claims 1 and 2, and also J (zL (c)) > J (zL (c¯)) =
J (zH (c¯)) by Claims 2 and 3. But then, J (zH (c)) < max (J (zL (c)) , J (zH (c¯))) = J (zL (c))
by strict quasiconvexity. Proceeding similarly for c < c¯, we have zL (c) ∈ (zL (c¯) , zH (c))
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by Claims 1 and 2, J (zH (c)) > J (zL (c¯)) by Claims 2 and 3, and therefore, J (zL (c)) <
max (J (zL (c¯)) , J (zH (c))) = J (zH (c)) by Claim 3. We conclude that J (zL (c)) T J (zH (c))
if and only if c T c¯. But then because U (c,σH)− U (c,σL) has the same signs as J (zH (c))−
J (zL (c)), we conclude that U (c,σH)−U (c,σL) is positive if c < c¯, negative if c > c¯, and zero
if c = c¯. Because the EDE selects σH and σL precisely when c < c¯ and c > c¯ respectively, EDE
utility is always equal to max (U (c,σH) , U (c,σL)). Because U (c,σ) is decreasing in c, we have
U (c,σH) > U (c,σL) > u˜ for c < c¯ and U (c,σH) < U (c,σL) < u˜ for c > c¯, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 7
Each consumer will eventually purchase exactly one good, so payments to firms are just
transfers that cancel out of the total surplus. Then the surplus is simply the gross expected
utility of consumers, Aμ + σz. For a fixed distribution of levels of diﬀerentiation across firms,
the socially optimal pattern of search is exactly the search strategy that consumers would choose
were they trying to maximize σz rather than σz− p. Suppose that levels of diﬀerentiation are
distributed with density φ(σ) across firms. A consumer trying to maximize σz uses a cutoﬀ
value v¯ given by Z σH
σL
Z ∞
v¯/σ
φ(σ)f(z)(σz − v¯)dzdσ = c (14)
We can write this as
R σH
σL φ(σ)σ
R∞
v¯/σ f(z)(z−v¯/σ)dz dσ =
R σH
σL φ(σ)
³
σ R∞v¯/σ 1− F (z) dz´ dσ = c.
Then observe that the inside term, σ R∞v¯/σ 1−F (z) dz, is increasing in σ: to see this, diﬀerentiate
with respect to σ to getZ ∞
v¯/σ
1− F (z) dz + v¯σ2 (1− F (v¯/σ)) =
1− F (v¯/σ)
σ (
Z ∞
v¯/σ
1− F (z)
1− F (v¯/σ) dz +
v¯
σ ) =
1− F (v¯/σ)
σ (E(z −
v¯
σ |z ≥
v¯
σ ) +
v¯
σ ) =
1− F (v¯/σ)
σ E(z|z ≥
v¯
σ ) >
1− F (v¯/σ)
σ E(z) = 0
Therefore, as φ(σ) transfers weight from lower to higher values of σ, the left-hand side of (14)
increases. In order to preserve the equality, v¯ must increase as well. Thus, whenever φ(σ)
does not place full weight on σH , v¯, and hence total surplus, can be raised by placing more
weight on σH , so the total surplus is maximized when all firms use σ = σH and when consumers
use a search rule that satisfies σH Rz≥v¯/σH 1− F (z) dz = c. But when p = p∗(σH) is constant
across all firms, we can define u¯ = Aμ − p∗(σH) + v¯ and write this search rule equivalently as
σH Rz≥(u¯+p∗(σH)−Aμ)/σH 1− F (z) dz = c, which is precisely the search rule that consumers use
in an equilibrium in which all firms choose σH . Thus, if there is an all σH EDE for search cost
c, then it is constrained eﬃcient.
Proof of Proposition 8
A firm that expects consumer cutoﬀ utility u and plans to oﬀer products with dispersion
level σ will optimally choose its price to satisfy (9) using distribution function FN (z) ≡ F (z)N .
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That is, its price solves
p = σ
1− FN
³
u+p−Aμ
σ
´
fN
³
u+p−Aμ
σ
´
where fN = F 0N . Write pL (u ; N) for the optimal price set by a firm choosing σ = σL, let
πL (u ; N) be the profit earned by such a firm, and let zL (u ; N) = u+pL(u ;N)−AμσL be the taste
shock of the marginal consumer for such a firm. (So πL (u ; N) = (1− FN (zL (u ; N))) pL (u ; N).)
Define pH (u ; N), πH (u ; N), and zH (u ; N) analogously for a firm choosing σ = σH . By de-
finition, we have πL (u˜ (N) ; N) ≡ πH (u˜ (N) ; N). In what follows, it is useful to treat N
as a continuous parameter. As a matter of mathematics, the profit functions πL (u ; N) and
πH (u ; N) are perfectly well defined at non-integer values of N , even though have no obvious
economic interpretation at these values. Apply the implicit function theorem to the identity
that defines u˜ (N) to get
du˜ (N)
dN
=
∂πL(u˜(N);N)∂N − ∂πH(u˜(N);N)∂N
∂πH(u˜(N);N)∂u − ∂πL(u˜(N);N)∂u
(15)
The proof of Proposition 2 demonstrates that πH (u;N) − πL (u,N) is strictly increasing
in u at u = u˜ (N), so the denominator is strictly positive. Thus, it suﬃces to show that the
numerator is negative. That is, increasing the size of the product line slightly, holding consumer
utility u˜ (N) fixed, improves profits relatively more at a σH firm than at a σL firm. To show
this, write πL (u ; N) in the form
πL (u ; N) =
Ã
1− F
µ
u+ pL (u ; N)−Aμ
σL
¶N!
pL (u ; N)
Recognizing that pL (u ; N) is optimized with respect to u and N , apply the envelope theorem
to get
∂πL (u;N)
∂N = −pL (u ; N)F
µ
u+ pL (u ; N)−Aμ
σL
¶N
lnF
µ
u+ pL (u ; N)−Aμ
σL
¶
= −pL (u ; N) (F (zL (u ; N)))N lnF (zL (u ; N))
For brevity, write ZL = zL (u˜ (N) ; N), ZH = zH (u˜ (N) ; N), and Π = πL (u˜ (N) ; N) =
πH (u˜ (N) ; N). Then we have
∂πL (u˜ (N) ;N)
∂N = −pL (u˜ (N) ; N)F (ZL)
N lnF (ZL)
= ξ (F (ZL))Π
where ξ (x) = − xN
1−xN lnx. In a similar manner, we can show that
∂πH(u˜(N);N)∂N = ξ (ZH)Π. The
proof of Proposition 2 also shows that ZH > ZL, and of course F (ZL) , F (ZH) ∈ (0, 1), so
to demonstrate that the numerator of (15) is negative, it suﬃces to show that ξ is a strictly
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increasing function on (0, 1). This is relatively straightforward. We have
ξ0 (x) = − x
N−1
(1− xN )2
¡
1− xN + lnxN¢
To evaluate the term in parentheses, define y = 1 − xN (with y ∈ (0, 1), since x ∈ (0, 1))
and take a series expansion of the log term to get
1− xN + lnxN = y + ln (1− y)
= y −
µ
y +
y2
2
+
y3
3
+ ...
¶
< 0
So ξ0 (x) > 0 for x ∈ (0, 1), as claimed. This completes the proof that u˜ (N) is strictly decreasing
in N . A fortiori, this result holds at the integer values of N that have economic meaning, so
we have u˜ (1) > u˜ (2) > u˜ (3) > ..., and so forth.
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